ON GERMAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR
The world of 2016 is unsettled. We in Germany and Europe are seeing and feeling the impact of a lack of freedom and of crises and conflicts. We are experiencing that peace and stability are not a matter of course even in Europe.

In this changed security situation, the task of the Federal Government is to redefine our country’s security policy interests, priorities and objectives and to develop its toolbox responsibly. The past years have shown that we must not take the achievements of the European post-war order for granted. We would not have believed it possible that borders would be redrawn by military force and in breach of international law in Europe in the 21st century. Wars and conflicts are raging on Europe’s doorstep. They have cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and uprooted millions more. At the same time, fragile and failing states provide a fertile breeding ground for Islamist terrorism, which also poses a direct threat to us in Germany and Europe. Cyber space is increasingly becoming a theatre of conflict; the internet is not only a force for good – ideologies of hatred and violence are also spread there.

Germany’s economic and political weight means that it is our duty to take on responsibility for Europe’s security in association with our European and transatlantic partners in order to defend human rights, freedom, democracy, the rule of law and international law. We must stand up even more for our shared values and demonstrate even greater commitment to security, peace and a rules-based order than we have done to date.

Our security is based on a strong and resolute North Atlantic Alliance and a united and resilient European Union. We will only be able to meet the great challenges of our era successfully if we strengthen and further develop these two pillars of our foreign, security and defence policy.

At all times, our aim should be to prevent crises and conflicts. Security policy must be forward-looking and sustainable. At the same time, we must be able to react quickly to violent conflicts, to provide help and to play our part in resolving conflicts rapidly. To this end, it is vital that we combine our civil and military instruments. But we must also take an honest, realistic view of the world: We will not be able to meet all of the challenges in the crisis regions on our own. This means that our partners in other regions of the world must do their part. To this end, we will offer a wide range of measures to enable them to resolve crises and conflicts by themselves.

Furthermore, we need to strengthen resilience throughout government and society in Germany and the European Union. Only in this way will we safeguard our open society and protect the freedom that is fundamental to our way of life.

The White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr describes the cornerstones of Germany’s security policy and the framework within which it operates. It identifies for the Federal Government areas where German security policy can be shaped. The White Paper sets the basis for the future course of the Bundeswehr as one of the instruments of German security policy. In recent years, the Bundeswehr has taken part in numerous missions abroad by side by side with Germany’s allies and partners. Along with German police officers and civilian aid workers, it has made a significant contribution to peace in the world. Our Bundeswehr will also be called upon in the future. In all operations, it demonstrates our willingness to uphold peace and security and resolutely defend our freedom. The Federal Government therefore has a responsibility and an obligation to provide the Bundeswehr with the necessary resources.

A further aim of this White Paper is to generate a debate in society on how Germany shapes its security policy in the future. It is thus my hope that the broad-based, lively discourse which began during the drafting of this White Paper will be continued fruitfully after its publication.

Berlin, 13 July 2016

Dr Angela Merkel
Federal Chancellor
Germany faces a wide range of security challenges. As an open society, a globally interconnected economy, and as a nation, we need to be able to meet these challenges responsibly both today and in the long term.

At the same time we must ask ourselves uncomfortable questions: What role should and must our country play in security policy? In what areas should we concentrate our diplomacy, development policy, and military involvement? And what kind of Bundeswehr do we need to enable our servicemen and women to protect our freedom and contribute to global stability?

This important discussion requires many different perspectives. This is why, in preparing the 2016 White Paper, we have adopted a new approach by consulting in detail with experts from Germany and abroad about the future of our security policy and the Bundeswehr, by exchanging views, and by taking up suggestions. This process has shown us very clearly where we are now – and how far we still have to go.

In the current crises, Germany has shown that it is willing to take responsibility in security policy. We have also shown that we are prepared to take the lead.

But our efforts can only be successful if they are interconnected: both in and together with international alliances and organisations and with our allies and partners. We know that our security is best served by responsibly shaping security policy together with our partners and in our alliances – with a strong NATO and a capable Europe. Germany stands for reliability and loyalty to its allies, and so does the Bundeswehr.

With great personal dedication, our servicemen and women are making outstanding contributions to peace and security – in Germany, Europe and around the world. For this reason, the men and women of the Bundeswehr rightly enjoy the respect, recognition and gratitude they deserve both at home and abroad.

As the demands on the Bundeswehr grow in variety and volume, the demands on its personnel will increase as well. The Bundeswehr needs the best possible equipment and sustainable funding in order to effectively meet challenges such as hybrid warfare, transnational terrorism, cyber attacks, and pandemics and at the same time to fulfil the requirements of stronger national and collective defence. In future it must have a comprehensive, modern range of capabilities at its disposal. It must also drive innovation and be a reliable and dependable partner to our allies.

We have already laid a firm foundation to build on. Whether it is our responsibility as a framework nation in joint capability development, our enhancing and enabling of local partners in fragile parts of the world, our involvement in a large number of operations, or the integration of armed forces in Europe – the Bundeswehr has shown initiative and practices “leadership from the centre” by assuming a leading role among partners.

What we need above all are the best people. Only with them can the Bundeswehr become more flexible and agile, and only with them can it develop the best ideas and concepts, which are ultimately the key to its success.

The first steps have been taken towards such a Bundeswehr – towards a Bundeswehr that is modern and fit for the future. We must now stay our course towards this goal.

The White Paper is a milestone on this journey. It offers the strategic framework and concrete targets needed to ensure the continuous modernisation of the Bundeswehr as a key instrument in our increasingly comprehensive approach to security.

Berlin, 13 July 2016

Dr Ursula von der Leyen
Federal Minister of Defence
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The 2016 White Paper: Strategic Review and Way Ahead

The White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr is the key German policy document on security policy. It is a strategic review of the current state and future course of German security policy. It is thus the principal guideline for the security policy decisions and measures of our country. It establishes a framework in terms of concepts and content and provides starting points for strengthening the whole-of-government approach and developing further ministerial strategies.

The White Paper defines Germany’s ambition to play an active and substantial role in security policy. It reflects our identity and understanding of security policy. On the basis of our values, national interests and an analysis of the security environment, it defines Germany’s strategic priorities and translates them into key areas of engagement for German security policy.

The last White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr was published in 2006. Our security environment has changed considerably since then. A wide range of different challenges are affecting Germany with unprecedented frequency and simultaneity. New threats and hazards have emerged in addition to those that already existed. The 2016 White Paper is characterised by continuity and, at the same time, profound changes in the security environment.

Security in the 21st century can only be guaranteed in an integrated network of all security actors and instruments. The White Paper therefore lays the foundations for Germany to take synchronised and comprehensive action in the field of security policy. It provides a framework for the use of all security policy instruments available to our nation.

The White Paper will lay the foundation for one of these instruments in particular, namely the Bundeswehr, to meet the challenges of the future.

In view of the volatile security environment, the central requirement for the Bundeswehr will be its ability to adapt to new challenges at any time. Its tasks, personnel and equipment must therefore be compatible with one another. The guidelines of the White Paper must be further specified for the Bundeswehr in subordinate documents.
Inclusive Development Process: A Starting Point for a New Security Policy Debate in our Country

The White Paper is also a contribution by the German Government to the security policy debate in our country. Its purpose is to intensify and enrich this debate.

In addition, it shows our international partners and allies how Germany sees its future role in the world in terms of security policy.

The 2016 White Paper is the first of its kind to be based on an inclusive participation phase. National and international experts as well as interested citizens were given various opportunities to participate in the discussion about the future of German security policy.

With this inclusive and participatory approach, the 2016 White Paper reflects a modern understanding of strategy development. It is fostered by participation, contributions and critical suggestions from the worlds of politics, science and civil society, as well as from industry, the interested public, and international partners. The inclusive approach has provided food for thought and ideas that have made a decisive contribution to the development of this new strategy document.

The White Paper is also an invitation and a request to actively continue the security policy debate following its publication, as security policy is a permanent endeavour for society as a whole in an open and healthy democracy.
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1.1 Germany’s Role in the World and Approach to Security

Our identity and the way we see security is influenced by the lessons we have learned from our history. They form part of our national identity and are enshrined in our constitution. At the same time, German identity is inseparably connected with European identity.

In the preamble to the German constitution, Germany states its commitment to “promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.” Our identity and understanding of security is thus comprehensive. It is about more than the absence of war and the provision of security for our country and its citizens. On the basis of a united Europe, our ambition is also to improve the conditions of human coexistence in a sustainable manner and to protect and strengthen international human rights norms.

Germany is highly interconnected with the rest of the world and – due to its economic, political and military significance, but also as a result of its vulnerabilities – has a responsibility to actively participate in shaping the global order. Germany is increasingly regarded as a key player in Europe. With this new reality come more options to exert influence but also increased responsibility.

Germany has a strong economy that benefits from a stable society, high-quality infrastructure, and a highly skilled workforce, which is augmented by immigration. Politically, Germany can rely on a strong network of bilateral, European, transatlantic and multilateral ties and institutional structures that provide its activities with legitimacy and make them effective.

In the long run, however, it is unlikely that Germany will retain its position as the world’s fourth-largest economy. The economies of the emerging powers in Asia and Latin America will likely overtake the German – although not the European – gross domestic product in the coming years.

Germany’s prosperity and economy are highly dependent on appropriate conditions – both in Europe and globally.

Germany is fully integrated into international trade and investment flows. Our country is particularly dependent on secure supply routes, stable markets, and functioning information and communication systems. This dependence will continue to increase. Germany’s competitiveness as an industrial nation therefore depends all the more on maintaining its lead in innovation. Knowledge remains a strategic resource for Germany.

Germany is prepared to provide a substantial, decisive and early stimulus to the international debate, to accept responsibility, and to assume leadership.
1.2 Germany’s Values and Security Interests

The commitment and aims of German governance are to ensure freedom, security and prosperity for our citizens, to promote peace, and to strengthen the rule of law. German security policy is tied to values and guided by interests. The guiding principles for the formulation of our national interests are:

- the values of our constitution, in particular human dignity and other basic rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as
- European law and international law, particularly the protection of universal human rights and the maintenance of peace.

Our security policy interests are moreover decisively determined by our geographical position at the heart of Europe and our membership in the EU, our economic strength and dependency on trade, our commitment to responsible engagement, as well as the imperative to preserve peace according to Article 26 of the German constitution.

In summary, the security interests of Germany are as follows:

- protecting our citizens as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country;

- protecting the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the citizens of our allies;

- maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law;

- ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy as well as free and unimpeded world trade;

- promoting the responsible use of limited goods and scarce resources throughout the world;

- deepening European integration and

- consolidating the transatlantic partnership.

Our interests remain closely interwoven with those of our allies and partners. Germany values reliability and loyalty to its allies. It is only in cooperation with others that Germany can protect its territory and open society, make effective use of its profound but limited resources, and unfold its innovative and productive potential. Pursuing German interests therefore always means taking into account the interests of our allies and those of other friendly nations.

At the same time, our ability to respond in an international – and particularly European and transatlantic – context is based on a clear national position.
2 Germany’s Security Environment

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In the past years, Germany’s security environment has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic and is therefore increasingly unpredictable.

Only by being fully aware of current trends and processes as well as the direct and indirect challenges we are facing can our security policy accurately target the causes, utilise existing scope for action, and anticipate future developments.

2.1 The International Order in Transition

The international order, which was established after World War II and whose organisations and institutions still provide a framework for international politics, is undergoing profound changes. The drivers and effects of these changes are varied and numerous.

Drivers of Change

The globalisation and digitalisation of recent decades have resulted in an interconnected world and interconnected societies. More and more people are gaining better access to information and technology. These political, economic and technological networks are the cause of far-reaching social transformation processes. The cyber and information domain, which has increasingly come to dominate our activities and communication, is a manifestation of this global interconnectivity.

At the same time, globalisation is also promoting the interconnection and spread of risks as well as their repercussions. These include epidemics, the possibility of cyber attacks and information operations, and transnational terrorism.

Anti-globalisation movements are also on the rise: introverted and often radical nationalism, violent extremism as well as religious fanaticism, which results from identity and legitimacy deficits and often from a decline in norms and values. These forces can intensify the disintegration of state orders.

Demographic transformations and urbanisation are further drivers of change. The growing world population is increasingly concentrated in urban coastal regions. As a result, these regions are gaining significance as the starting and focal point of conflicts.

Germany’s security environment has become even more complex, volatile, dynamic and thus increasingly unpredictable.

In addition, some societies are growing older, while others have a large proportion of young people. In order to remain globally competitive, ageing societies must find new ways of receiving sufficient qualified immigrants, retaining skilled workers, and adapting production conditions to older workforces. Younger societies, on the other hand, are facing the fundamental challenge of providing prospects for young people and creating the necessary training programmes and jobs.

In many parts of the world, the state, as the central element of order, also faces other challenges to its legitimacy and competency: Poor governance and informal economies, which are characterised by widespread nepotism and corruption and are frequently associated with organised crime, are contributing to innerstate conflicts as well as regional and international crises.
Multipolarity and the Diffusion of Power

Politically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a multipolar order. The global distribution of power is changing – power is shifting within the international community but also between states and non-state actors. As a result of technological advances, transnational non-state networks are becoming particularly important, and they are increasingly exerting influence in international security policy.

The growing economic, political and military influence of key states, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, will lead to increasing multipolarity and shifts in geopolitical power. Dynamically growing societies are connecting their increasing wealth and participation in the global economy to an aspiration to extend their influence in regional and global affairs. They are underlining this with a significant increase in defence spending and through an intensified coordination of their interests in new organisations and groups of states.

It is estimated that China, for example, could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will account for approximately one sixth. It is likely that these two countries together will have an economy equal in size to that of the entire OECD area by the middle of the current century. When it comes to defence, China already spends approximately as much as all EU states combined. The international influence of other key states will also continue to increase.

This means that organisations and forums consisting mainly of members of this group of states will become more important. The BRICS group is one example, as are ASEAN and a number of increasingly influential Latin American and African regional and sub-regional organisations. The increasing significance of the G20, which has established itself as an important forum for global economic and financial cooperation, is also mainly due to the growing influence of such key states.

As a result of these global shifts, the regional dimension of security is becoming ever more important. This entails the risk that competing paradigms in international politics may develop. Fragmentation with different and potentially competing regional systems would weaken the universally binding nature of the foundations and institutions of our current global order. This development would have far-reaching implications for Germany as a globally networked country that depends on free access to global routes of information, communication, supply, transport and trade.

In order to effectively counter these risks of fragmentation at a global level, multipolarity must be appropriately reflected in the United Nations System.

In this multipolar world, the United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy. In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in Europe, to take on more responsibility. This trend is likely to continue in view of economic and political developments in the United States. Its European partners will likely be expected to show more commitment in pursuing common objectives and strategies.

The United States of America has guaranteed security and stability in Europe since 1945. Germany has a long-standing partnership with the United States which is deeply rooted in our society and is reflected by a broad spectrum of common security policy interests.

The transatlantic security partnership will grow closer and become more productive the more we Europeans are prepared to shoulder a larger share of the common burden, and the more our American partners engage in shared decision-making. Germany embraces the joint responsibility that arises from the common Euro-Atlantic system of values.

Rules-Based Euro-Atlantic Order of Peace and Stability Called into Question

Since the end of the Cold War, European countries – together with the United States of America – have established a unique peace order on the European continent to which all participating states in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have committed themselves. This order is based on the idea that European security is indivisible. Its institutional backbone is a tight network of multilateral regional and pan-European organisations and institutions which is characterised by cooperation among themselves as well as with third parties on the basis of common values and rules for their implementation.

Although this peace order has never been able to completely prevent the outbreak of local violent conflicts in Europe, it has provided a basis for their resolution and thus for far-reaching stability.

Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This has far-reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany.
The crisis in and surrounding Ukraine is the concrete manifestation of long-term internal and external developments. Russia is rejecting a close partnership with the West and placing emphasis on strategic rivalry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an independent power centre with global ambitions.

This is reflected, for example, by an increase in Russia’s military activities along its borders with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). In the course of extensively modernising its armed forces, Russia appears to be prepared to test the limits of existing international agreements. By increasingly using hybrid instruments to purposefully blur the borders between war and peace, Russia is creating uncertainty about the nature of its intentions. This calls for responses from the affected states, but also from the EU and NATO.

Without a fundamental change in policy, Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of our continent in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, Europe and Russia remain linked by a broad range of common interests and relations. As the EU’s largest neighbour and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has a special regional and global responsibility when it comes to meeting common challenges and managing international crises. Sustainable security and prosperity in and for Europe cannot therefore be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia. It is therefore all the more important that, in our relations with Russia, we find the right balance between collective defence and increased resilience on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative security and sectoral cooperation on the other.

What is important for the common security space of our continent is thus not the development of a new security architecture, but rather respect for and consistent adherence to existing and proven common rules and principles.

European Project Under Pressure

The EU is much in demand as a major international player and partner owing to its economic strength, its global alliances, and its commitment to the rule of law. At the same time, it is confronted by the challenge of maintaining and cultivating internal cohesion and solidarity among its member states.

The EU and its member states are facing a special challenge on account of the simultaneity and consequences of the economic and financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the instabilities on its external borders. The situation has been further exacerbated because a number of member states are placing an increased emphasis on their own national interests. The success of the European project and the further deepening of the integration process therefore require the continued commitment of all member states and their citizens as well as an awareness of the fact that losses and gains in security and prosperity will affect us all.

Europe’s internal challenges also affect the domain of security and defence. Here, armed forces, which are still organised on a national basis, have been significantly reduced in recent years under the pressure of the debt crisis and in view of the allegedly peaceful environment. Meanwhile, other states outside the EU have invested heavily in their armed forces, and they will continue to do so in the future.

The EU will have to make a substantial effort to stay in the lead economically and technologically and to remain a role model for other societies around the world. It will continue to have a stabilising effect on its neighbours only if it overcomes internal fault lines, successfully counteracts centrifugal forces, resolutely continues on the path of modernisation and innovation, and thereby strengthens its internal cohesion and unity. It is therefore necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Communities torn apart – the EU is facing a number of challenges.

Resolute and united – even in times of crisis.
2.2 Challenges for German Security Policy

Germany’s security policy is today facing a wide range of previously unknown challenges. They differ in terms of the intensity of potential damage, the immediacy of their impact on our security, and the long-term consequences. They are characterised by a mutually reinforcing dynamic. At the same time, the relevance of geographical distance is shrinking as a result of globalisation.

All in all, the range of risks to our security is becoming broader, more diverse, and increasingly unpredictable.

Transnational Terrorism

Transnational terrorism is a global challenge. It is not restricted to individual states or regions and, on the whole, it is a phenomenon of growing relevance. Transnational terrorist organisations and networks benefit from failing states, which provide them with safe havens and, in some cases, even with territorial control. They use social media and digital communication to generate resources, attract supporters, spread propaganda, and plan attacks. They increasingly have the ability to attack targets with cyber capabilities and to use chemical agents in terror attacks. In the future, this ability could potentially be extended to include biological and radioactive substances. In addition, terrorist organisations are using crime as a means of funding their activities and extending their reach to other regions. Following and disrupting their financial flows has proven to be a difficult task.

Besides al-Qaeda and its regional affiliates, which are still launching terror attacks against Western targets, the terrorist organisation known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has now firmly established itself with state-like structures in parts of the Middle East. Its current objective is to achieve a territorial presence and to project power throughout the entire Middle East as well as North Africa in order to realise its archaic and intolerant “caliphate.” In addition, it is already exporting its inhuman ideology and terrorism to our continent and our society.

This terrorism regards our free, open and tolerant society as both an enemy and a target.

Terrorist attacks represent the most immediate challenge to our security. The radicalisation of sympathisers and the return of foreign terrorist fighters from crisis and conflict areas to Germany and other EU states and thus in many cases to the Schengen Area mean that this risk is continuously increasing. Moreover, it is occurring at the interface between internal and external security.

Effectively combating transnational terrorism will therefore require close national and international as well as European and transatlantic cooperation. It will also be necessary to use political, legal, intelligence, police and military resources. Besides hazard prevention, a wide range of additional measures will be necessary in order to successfully deal with the ideological, religious, social and socio-economic causes of radicalisation and terrorism. Radical thinking and behaviour must also be countered at home.
Challenges from the Cyber and Information Domain

In our globalised world, the safe, secure and free use of the cyber and information domain is a fundamental prerequisite for the activities of both the state and private individuals. Increasing digitalisation in all walks of life and the increasing interconnectivity of individuals, organisations and states are playing a unique role in our present and future opportunities. This development has, however, made the state, society and the economy particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks. As a consequence, urgent steps are needed to protect against threats.

The quantity and above all the type of threats have noticeably changed. Technological advances – from simple viruses to complex attacks that are difficult to detect (advanced persistent threats) – represent a dramatic change in the nature of the threat situation.

Access to destructive malware is relatively easy and inexpensive. As a result, the means to carry out cyber attacks are not restricted to state actors. Terrorist groups, criminal organisations, and skilled individuals can potentially cause serious damage with minimal effort. Attempts to establish internationally binding regulations or confidence- and security-building measures may therefore have only a limited effect.

The spectrum of threats in the cyber and information domain includes the theft and fraudulent use of personal data, industrial espionage, the damage of critical infrastructure with severe consequences for the civilian population, and the disruption or complete shutting down of government and military communications.

Cyber attacks on states and critical infrastructure have been a reality for some time. Numerous incidents have occurred in similarly advanced and digitalised states and armed forces in recent years. Although it is sometimes possible to identify patterns of attack, most modern high-value attacks are specially tailored to fit the targeted system.

A special challenge for open and pluralistic societies is the use of digital communication to influence public opinion, for example through hidden attempts to sway discussions on social media and by manipulating information on news portals. This approach has already gained special significance as an element of hybrid warfare.

Attacks from the cyber and information domain are easy to conceal. Together with the large number and variety of perpetrators, this makes clear attribution difficult. Conventional instruments of deterrence thus face unprecedented challenges.

The effects of cyber attacks can equal those of armed conflicts and may escalate into the non-virtual world. Although it is unlikely that a conflict between states will be carried out exclusively in the cyber and information domain in the foreseeable future, operations in the cyber and information domain are already playing an increasingly significant role in military conflicts. This trend will increase in the coming years.

On the whole, the cyber and information domain has become an area of international and strategic importance that has practically no limits. Its significance will continue to grow.
Besides working on a common understanding of the application of international law, we must also improve our responsiveness and resilience as well as our capability to prevent and defend against cyber attacks and information operations. This includes coherent and coordinated strategies in NATO and the EU.

As attribution continues to be a problem inherent in cyber, there is an especially large risk of uncontrolled escalation in the event of a cyber incident. We must take preventive steps to reduce this risk through confidence building and conflict resolution mechanisms.

There are few areas where internal and external security are as closely intertwined as they are in cyber space. The threat situation in cyber space necessitates a holistic approach in the framework of cyber security policy. Ensuring cyber security and defence is therefore a whole-of-government task that must be performed collectively. This includes the joint protection of critical infrastructure. The tasks to be carried out are specified in the Cyber Security Strategy, which is developed under the direction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Defence aspects of whole-of-government cyber security are core tasks of the Federal Ministry of Defence and the Bundeswehr, while overall responsibility for international cyber security policy lies with the Federal Foreign Office.

Cyber security in Germany is the desired IT state in which the risks our country faces from cyber space are reduced to an acceptable and manageable level. This objective can be achieved by means of cyber protection (measures taken against criminal cyber activities), cyber defence (measures taken against cyber attacks mainly from abroad), cyber security policy, and cyber foreign policy.

Interstate Conflict
The renaissance of traditional power politics, which involves the use of military means to pursue national interests and entails considerable armaments efforts, elevates the risk of violent interstate conflict – even in Europe and its neighbourhood, as is illustrated by the example of Russian actions in Ukraine.

The stability of the international system is being jeopardised by the increasing role of the military in the ambitions of emerging powers in combination with ongoing territorial conflicts and struggles for regional hegemony. This is happening not only in and around Europe. Regional territorial disputes in connection with power projections are a source of concern in particular for the countries of Southeast and East Asia. Furthermore, the risk of escalating interstate conflict increases when nationalist sentiments gain in importance and are instrumentalised.

In addition, non-state actors and in particular state actors are resorting to methods of hybrid warfare. This involves the use of military means below the threshold of a conventional war. The aim is to undermine a state’s capacity to govern. This approach combines various civilian and military means and instruments in a way that does not reveal their actual aggressive and offensive intentions until all pieces of the puzzle have been brought together.

Hybrid threats call for a hybrid analytical capability as well as corresponding defence readiness and capabilities. This has a significant impact on our understanding of national and collective defence in the 21st century.

Fragile States and Poor Governance
Numerous states are characterised by weak legitimacy, poor governance, weak structures, an inadequate supply of basic goods and services, unequal access to social prosperity, corruption and – at the same time – weak economies. Fragile and failed states can only maintain internal and external security to a limited degree. They can only fulfil their obligation to protect their citizens to a limited extent, if at all. The erosion of state structures creates safe havens for para-state and terrorist organisations, encourages organised crime, human and arms trafficking, and thus creates spaces beyond the reach of the international order. These factors fuel ongoing crises in many parts of the world – including on the African continent and in the Middle East.

Political, ethnic, religious and confessional conflicts and civil wars are affecting the international security environment in an arc of crisis stretching from North Africa and the Sahel through the Horn of Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia. The situation is exacerbated by rivalry between regional powers striving for hegemony, inter-confessional disputes such as those between Sunni and Shi’a communities, as well as by conflicts over the relationship between religion and the state up to and including the fundamental rejection of and active fight against the state. These problems will be intensified in the future as a result of high population growth rates and the depletion of natural resources.
This instability in Europe’s neighbourhood fosters the creation of safe havens for international terrorist networks and human trafficking groups and can impair international trade and the global supply of energy and resources. It is thus a risk for our security.

Our security policy must focus on strengthening legitimate political structures in the affected regions and increasing their resilience. The early detection and prevention of state failure and the long-term stabilisation of fragile and failing states require a comprehensive approach that can make a timely and substantial contribution to the mobilisation of appropriate foreign, development and security policy instruments in the area of prevention and crisis management.

Global Arms Build-Up and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Regional tensions and the claims to power of emerging economic actors are also leading to regional arms races.

Arms build-ups can undermine the stability of the international system and, indirectly, the security of Europe and Germany. Build-ups of conventional armaments can change the military balance at the regional and global levels and increase the risk of violent interstate conflicts. This situation can be considerably exacerbated by the development of new technologies that are not yet part of current arms control regimes.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons entails unpredictable risks. These risks are compounded by the development and proliferation of delivery systems. In addition, terrorist networks could gain possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Effective arms control, transparency and confidence building as well as a restrictive arms export policy remain the precondition, the means and the basis for peaceful conflict resolution and disarmament. Technological advances and strategic developments make it necessary to continually adapt our approach in this field.

Threats to Information and Communication Systems, Supply Lines, Transportation and Trade Routes as well as to the Secure Supply of Raw Materials and Energy
In the future, the prosperity of our country and the well-being of our citizens will significantly depend on the unhindered use of global information and communication systems, supply lines, transportation and trade routes as well as on a secure supply of raw materials and energy. Any interruption of access to these global public goods on land, in the air, at sea, in the cyber and information domain, and in space involves considerable risks for the ability of our state to function and for the prosperity of our citizens. Besides terrorist attacks, other potential causes include piracy, forced political, economic and military measures, as well as failing states and regional crises. Increasing investments by various states in capabilities that deny third countries access to specific areas (anti-access/area denial) are particularly significant in this context.

In view of the many potential causes and targets, Germany and its allies and partners must make flexible use of foreign and security policy instruments in order to prevent and remove disruptions and blockades.
Climate Change

Climate change is a global phenomenon and is already affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. In addition, climate change has significant and existential implications for many states and their populations. As a consequence, access to water and other limited basic resources is becoming an existential threat for an increasing number of states and regions. It is therefore increasingly relevant for security policy and indirectly for Germany.

In combination with resource scarcity and population growth, climate change is also destabilising structures and aggravating conflicts, particularly in fragile regions. States that are unable to take adequate countermeasures can be pulled into a downward spiral. Possible results are state failure, violent conflicts and migration – usually along pre-existing lines of conflict in society.

Germany therefore advocates making climate change a permanent item on the security agenda of international organisations and forums such as the UN, the EU and the G7. In the coming years we must integrate climate issues even more systematically into Germany’s crisis prevention and stabilisation activities and help strengthen the resilience of potentially affected regions.

Uncontrolled and Irregular Migration

Around the world, people are being driven from their homes by armed conflict, persecution and displacement, adverse economic, social and ecological conditions, as well as by poverty and hunger. Organised crime and terrorist networks in their countries of origin and transit are exploiting the desperation of migrants in order to generate income or to recruit new fighters.

Europe and Germany in particular are frequent destinations for migrants and refugees. Asylum for persecuted people is an important part of our constitution. The economic and social gap between Europe and its neighbouring regions, which is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, and above all the ongoing violent conflicts in many parts of the world will lead to a considerable potential for migration even in the coming decades.

Migration in itself does not pose a risk to Germany’s security. On the contrary, Germany needs legal and orderly immigration to compensate for its aging population.

In large numbers, uncontrolled and irregular migration can, however, entail risks both for the immediately affected region as well as for Europe and Germany. The ability to absorb and integrate migrants can be overstretched, which can lead to social instability. Refugee movements resulting from violent conflicts can also cause such conflicts to spread throughout a region.

The causes of flight and irregular migration must be addressed in a joint effort by the international community and the countries of origin and transit. It is particularly important to provide support for internally displaced persons and for refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries.

Germany embraces its responsibility for managing the humanitarian consequences of refugee movements. This challenge can, however, only be appropriately controlled and managed on the basis of an effective European strategy and practice.
Epidemics and Pandemics

World population growth and increasing global mobility are promoting the spread of diseases and epidemics as well as outbreaks of pandemics.

Even locally confined outbreaks of particularly contagious diseases can overwhelm public and other services and precipitate a collapse of healthcare systems and public order. This can result in regional destabilisation. At the same time, there is a risk that diseases could spread regionally or globally. This poses systemic risks, in addition to the immediate danger to human life. These risks can emerge as a result of stress on national and international healthcare systems, severe disruptions of transnational traffic and economic systems, as well as the de facto quarantining of affected regions. Major challenges are posed by the rapid and appropriate deployment of material and specialist personnel in hard-to-reach areas as well as by effective prevention through local education and health protection measures.

Besides health risks in directly affected areas, diseases can also spread to Germany and pose a danger to our population. In such cases, our healthcare system could be faced with enormous challenges, which would be accompanied by considerable economic costs.

Germany supports the prevention and management of such challenges in particular through improvements to the coordination and crisis management capabilities of multilateral organisations like WHO. Important contributions in this respect are, for example, support for existing European instruments under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (European Medical Corps) and the creation of a contingent of physicians and specialist medical personnel at both national and European levels as well as logistical capabilities for rapidly deploying such personnel to crisis regions.

RADICALISATION POTENTIAL AS A RESULT OF LIMITED PROSPECTS IN RAPIDLY GROWING SOCIETIES

Many developing societies are characterised by a particularly high percentage of young people. These young people are looking for opportunities – for their own development, for economic security and for social integration. By promoting education, Germany can contribute towards stabilisation.

Employment promotes social participation and integration as well as self-esteem and is therefore important for the cohesion of society. Gainful employment gives the lives of people an internal and external structure. Problems with integration into the labour market, the experience of unemployment at a young age, and the resulting lack of prospects can lead to violence and radicalisation. Youth employment is therefore closely linked to the prevention of violence and is critical for our security.

Internationally, the risk of unemployment among people under the age of 25 is almost three times higher than for older people. In some countries, up to two-thirds of the young people are unemployed or only temporarily employed.

Entering the labour market is particularly difficult for young men in the Middle East and North Africa, which is why radical groups have been successful in recruiting new members. This can result in a threat to public security not only in these countries, but also in neighbouring regions and further afield.

In view of the high social costs of youth unemployment and the resulting threat to public security, it is all the more important that we mobilise all social and political forces to counteract this trend as early as possible. Supporting a targeted and successful education and labour market policy in the affected countries could potentially pay a double dividend: It contributes not only to individual development and economic prosperity but also to public security.

In future, our comprehensive approach will therefore place an even stronger focus on the labour market. Socio-economic factors that limit prospects and can cause security problems will play a more prominent role in our efforts to promote economic development and improve infrastructure and in our initiatives to strengthen the labour market and enhance training and education. The main focus will be on regions whose fragility could directly or indirectly affect the security situation in Europe and Germany.

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## 3 GERMANY’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

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Germany’s strategic priorities define our country’s security ambitions on the basis of our values and interests and in a way that reflects the challenges we face. They are essential for identifying key areas of engagement at national and international levels which are the focus of German security policy. The strategic priorities therefore not only specify what Germany is willing to do to safeguard its interests in the security environment. They also identify areas in which Germany is prepared to assume responsibility and lead.

3.1 Guaranteeing a Whole-of-Government Approach to Security

It is no longer possible to draw a sharp distinction between internal and external security. Disruptions and threats can frequently be found in the grey area in between. The vulnerabilities of our open and globally interconnected society are deliberately targeted.

These circumstances necessitate an effective whole-of-government approach to security. This includes protecting the sovereignty and integrity of German territory and German citizens and rescuing German nationals in emergency situations abroad.

Strengthening the resilience and robustness of our country so that it can deal with current and future threats is of particular importance for our whole-of-government approach to security. This means intensifying cooperation between government bodies, citizens and private operators of critical infrastructure, as well as the media and network operators. Everyone involved in this approach must work closely together.

3.2 Strengthening the Cohesion and Capacity to Act of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union

Germany’s security is inextricably linked to that of its allies in NATO and the EU. The transatlantic alliance is vital to the security of Europe. Only together with the United States can Europe effectively defend itself against the threats of the 21st century and guarantee a credible form of deterrence. Germany was able to rely on the solidarity and readiness of the Allies over a period of almost forty years during the Cold War. It therefore recognises its duty and responsibility to contribute to collective defence on the basis of solidarity. Alliance solidarity is a fundamental principle of German governance.

Strengthening the cohesion and capacity to act of NATO and the EU is of paramount importance for Germany.

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A whole-of-government approach to security – dealing with emergencies, disasters and new threats is a task we all share.
3.3 Unhindered Use of Information and Communication Systems, Supply Lines, Transportation and Trade Routes as well as the Secure Supply of Raw Materials and Energy

Our economy relies as much on the secure supply of raw materials and on secure international transportation routes as it does on functioning information and communication systems.

Securing maritime supply routes and ensuring freedom of the high seas is of significant importance for an exporting nation like Germany which is highly dependent on unimpeded maritime trade. Disruptions to our supply routes caused by piracy, terrorism and regional conflicts can have negative repercussions on our country’s prosperity.

Space security is also becoming a key issue for the international community. Space applications and, in particular, satellite systems are a fundamental component of our critical infrastructure. All aspects of national and international communication and navigation decisively depend on them.

Germany must therefore work towards ensuring the unhindered use of ground, air and sea lines of communication as well as of space and the cyber and information domain. Continuously reviewing and refining agreements and institutions that ensure a rules-based international order will remain an important task.

3.4 Early Recognition, Prevention and Resolution of Crises and Conflicts

Crises, conflicts, failing states, and humanitarian disasters influence not only directly affected states and regions but also indirectly affected states and regions such as Germany and Europe. The earlier crises and conflicts are countered by preventive measures, the greater the chance of preventing escalation and of achieving stability.

Germany must participate in the prevention and stabilisation of crises and conflicts as well as in post-crisis and post-conflict management, depending on the extent to which it is affected and its available options. A forward-looking, comprehensive and sustained approach is required for this purpose which also includes civil society and cultural factors. Prevention always takes precedence. Long-term prevention and stabilisation will only succeed if local and regional actors are enabled to assume responsibility for themselves. Strengthening good governance and respect for human rights in such states is therefore of paramount importance.

The early recognition of crises is essential for effective involvement at an early stage. We must combine national and international, state and non-state expertise to create a clear overall picture. This means using not only innovative ways and approaches (from “need to know” to “need to share”) but also instruments and methods that enable a wide range of information to be pooled, analysed and evaluated (for instance big data and advanced analytics).
3.5 Commitment to a Rules-Based International Order

Germany is committed to help shape and refine the rules-based international order. This international order is based on norms and values. Only it allows states and individuals to enjoy security and develop freely. It makes free and fair trade possible. It is not might but right that creates lasting peace and stability.

Particular attention must be paid to the global enforcement of international law and to the universal application and observance of human rights. Above all, this means modernising and strengthening global and regional organisations such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE, as well as other regional organisations. The same applies to European and global disarmament and arms control regimes.

The full effect of rules and norms can only unfold, however, if effective sanctions are imposed in case of violations of these rules and norms. In this context, the range of instruments for imposing economic and personal sanctions must be refined and made more targeted. In addition, Germany advocates strengthening international criminal prosecution and jurisdiction.

Right not might – Germany is committed to the global enforcement of international law.
4 KEY AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT IN GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

4.1 Key National Areas of Engagement
- Strengthening and Expanding Our Strategic Capacity
- Developing Sustainable Security
- Enhancing the Comprehensive Approach
- Promoting Security and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Endeavour
- Assuming Responsibility for International Stability and Security

4.2 Key International Areas of Engagement
- Germany in the United Nations
- Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance
- Germany in the European Union
- Germany in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships and Ad Hoc Cooperation
- Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Our approach to ensuring security begins in Germany. We must therefore have a synchronised and comprehensive approach to security at national level and coordinate and further develop our instruments.

Our approach to security is augmented at international level. Key national and international areas must complement one another and create synergies.

The following fundamental requirements are derived from our interests, the security environment, and our strategic priorities and apply to all key areas of engagement:

4.1 Key National Areas of Engagement

Our commitment to international security and stability is at the same time a contribution to our national security. Both require a strategic capacity and forward thinking as well as sustainable resources and the networking of our security instruments.

The whole-of-government approach to security has many faces – our approach to ensuring security begins in Germany.
Enhancing the Comprehensive Approach

The comprehensive approach is the guiding principle of our Government. Our country possesses a wide range of expertise and instruments that are used to tackle challenges at home and abroad.

In view of the rapidly changing security environment and the increasing intertwining of internal and external security, the comprehensive approach must be enhanced and its implementation must be optimised. To this end,

- the German Government must strengthen its political work and decision-making structures with regard to key issues of German foreign and security policy, thereby ensuring that political requirements are translated even more effectively into preventive and coherent government action; the Federal Security Council and other appropriate interministerial formats play a central role in this structure;
- situation centres at the strategic and operational levels must connect and share available information and focus it for the political level; the ability of the German Government to analyse and assess developments will thus be placed on a broader foundation;
- the exchange of personnel between ministries must be intensified; this will promote the growth of expertise and the flow of information at all levels and
- joint training and exercises for state and non-state actors must be promoted to enable them to operate throughout the entire crisis cycle; this will further enhance extensive cooperation on the basis of mutual understanding.

Promoting Security and Resilience: A Whole-of-Society Endeavour

Although absolute security for the people of Germany remains unattainable, a comprehensive security policy can reduce risks. This is why a resolute approach to ensuring security must be conceived and carried out in a whole-of-government manner. Such an approach comprises hazard prevention and defence, organises them for the purpose of tackling internal and external threats, and uses resources with foresight and sound judgement.

The task spectrum includes national and collective defence as well as civil protection and disaster control.

National security is not only a task of the state, but increasingly a joint task of the state, industry, the scientific community, and society. A common understanding of potential risks is the basis on which to build whole-of-society resilience.

National security is not only a task of the state, but increasingly a joint task of the state, industry, the scientific community, and society.

The state and industry already enjoy a close security partnership that encompasses the protection not only of critical infrastructure but also of the economy. Preserving and protecting expertise and capabilities in security-relevant areas, particularly regarding key technologies, will continue to be of paramount importance.

The German Government will render its approach to national security more comprehensive by

- continuously identifying and adapting areas requiring protection;
- further developing civil defence planning (maintenance of state and government functions, civil protection, supply, support of the armed forces) with the goal of harmonising crisis management procedures;
- institutionalising a whole-of-society discussion on future security requirements at the Federal Academy for Security Policy;
- intensifying the security partnership between the state, industry, and the scientific community through regular exchanges of information and expertise and
- putting this partnership into practice particularly in the cyber and information domain. Therefore, Germany’s Cyber Security Strategy will place greater emphasis on preventive measures and also address these measures in a holistic approach; in addition, we will expand international cooperation, in particular with our allies in NATO and the EU.

Together even stronger – state and non-state actors have long worked together, not only in providing assistance in areas of crisis and conflict.
Assuming Responsibility for International Stability and Security

By taking early and comprehensive action, Germany works to eradicate the causes of conflicts and to promote the establishment of viable institutions and structures for peaceful conflict management at international level. Crisis prevention, stabilisation and peace consolidation call for tailored instruments. Security sector reform and the promotion of the rule of law and of democratic structures are therefore of particular importance in all phases of conflict. Germany will respond with strategic perseverance to the enormous challenges associated with the long-term stabilisation of fragile, failing and failed states.

Civilian and military instruments complement one another in our comprehensive approach. Priority is given to preventive problem-solving.

Our commitment to enabling our partners not only to manage conflicts independently but also to ensure their national and regional security is therefore of particular importance – wherever possible, this must be part of a comprehensive approach to security sector reform. Our efforts focus on training as well as support and advice for the purpose of capacity building.

As the challenges of the 21st century are transnational in both character and effect, and as states, societies and economies become more interdependent, we must build resilience jointly with our allies and partners. The interconnection of all resilience-building measures at every level is based on the recognition that enhanced resilience at international level will also benefit security at national level.

ENHANCING RESILIENCE

In order to build resilience, we must be prepared to continuously and flexibly refine existing structures, infrastructure and processes. Establishing the relevant capacities for the early and preventive identification of vulnerabilities is therefore of central importance. This must be accompanied by a discussion on the limits of security and acceptable levels of risk for the state, the economy and society. The guiding principle of communication between all parties must be transparency, which at the same time must take into account the sensitive nature of certain information.

The state, the economy and society are all equally susceptible to risks. The physical infrastructure of the state and the economy is a target as is public opinion, which is often subject to external influence. Building long-term resilience in our open and democratic system is therefore a whole-of-society task. Society’s ability to protect and help itself in the event of a crisis complements public and commercial measures to prevent and manage crises.

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This enhance and enable approach is the logical extension of our preventive approach to security.

In future, there will continue to be situations in which robust military intervention in accordance with international law is needed to enable diplomacy to move toward acceptable political solutions.

Germany will pursue this overall approach to stabilising its international environment by

- employing diplomatic means to avoid, contain or end violence, crises and conflicts and by taking on additional responsibility in political processes, for instance through mediation;
- maintaining military means across the entire mission and task spectrum and at all levels of intensity, from observer missions and humanitarian operations to robust peace enforcement;
- maintaining the resources needed to ensure that stabilisation and reconstruction can secure the achievements of completed military operations;
- adapting decision-making processes to ever-shorter response times and to the requirements of a multi-lateral capacity for action and
- creating teams of civilian experts which can be deployed to crisis areas at an early stage and at short notice, thus increasing its ability to respond to and de-escalate crises.
4.2 Key International Areas of Engagement

Germany in the United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is the only global forum in which issues of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace consolidation are addressed. The UN Charter forms the legal basis of our world order. The United Nations Security Council has primary responsibility for safeguarding world peace and for international security.

The expanded concept of security is of central importance for the UN and is reflected, for example, in
- the safeguarding of human rights;
- the concern for sustainable development;
- peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations;
- the fight against hunger, poverty, pandemics, diseases and drug trafficking and
- the protection of the climate, the environment and natural resources.

In addition to the interstate conflicts for which the UN Charter was designed, new challenges are increasingly threatening peace and security. These include fragile statehood, innerstate conflicts with severe crimes against the civilian population, and asymmetric threats through terrorism and cyber attacks. Faced with these challenges, the tried and trusted means and methods of UN peacekeeping are increasingly stretched to their limits.

In addition, the transition from traditional UN operations involving ceasefire monitoring to complex multidimensional missions with at times robust mandates presents the UN with considerable personnel, financial, logistical and conceptual challenges.

It is therefore our primary goal to make the UN system more robust, to strengthen the UN, and to enable it to perform its tasks more efficiently.

Germany will continue to help the UN adapt to increasingly complex tasks, in particular by
- strengthening the responsiveness of the UN. The recommendations of the Peace Operations Review have set the course to achieve this goal;
- encouraging the participation of women in all phases of the conflict cycle and improving the protection of women and children in conflicts through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325;
- expanding the role played by Germany, for example by increasing our contributions of equipment and personnel to and assuming leadership responsibility in UN missions (civilian, police and military) and the United Nations Secretariat;
- supporting UN missions with high-value civilian and military capabilities;
- strengthening the UN’s ability to manage international tensions caused by incidents in cyber space based on the recommendations of the Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE);
- assuming additional responsibility in political processes, for example, by providing mediators and contributing to crisis prevention and management and
- making steady progress towards the long-term goal of reforming the Security Council. The Security Council will only be able to permanently ensure its legitimacy if its composition takes account of the world order of the 21st century. Germany remains willing to assume greater responsibility as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council.

HUMAN SECURITY

When the international community adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, it expressly recognised for the first time ever that peace and security are inseparably linked to sustainable development and respect for human rights. Peace and security are only permanently possible in and between inclusive societies that observe the rule of law and maintain good governance and effective institutions. An international order based on partnership, equitable globalisation, commitment to ensuring universal respect for human rights, the fight against extreme poverty and hunger, the protection of our natural environment so that all people can live in dignity in their native countries, and the creation of human security worldwide are all factors that contribute to our national security.

UN – responsible for world peace.
ON SECURITY POLICY – KEY AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT IN GERMAN SECURITY POLICY

Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance
The North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) is an indispensable guarantor of German, European and transatlantic security. It connects North America and Europe in a political as well as military organisation. For more than six decades, NATO has guaranteed the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of its members. It reflects a mutual commitment to protect the transatlantic partnership of values against threats of any kind and ensures the indispensable commitment of the United States to the security of Europe. On account of this special nature, NATO remains the anchor and main framework of action for German security and defence policy. Strengthening NATO also serves to strengthen our transatlantic partnership.

Reference points for NATO’s further development in the security environment of the 21st century continue to be its three core tasks: collective defence, international crisis management, and cooperative security.

Collective Defence
NATO is an alliance founded on the principle of collective defence. In the event of an armed attack, Germany can rely on the assistance of its Allies in Europe and North America. At the same time, all our Allies can count on Germany’s assistance and support. The target and origin of a potential attack are therefore of little importance.

Effective collective defence is vital to our existence in view of the return of violence and violent threats to European politics and the instabilities in NATO’s neighbourhood. This is particularly true in light of the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, not to mention the extensive military build-up taking place in many states. NATO will continue to rely primarily on deterrence to counter external threats. For this purpose, the Alliance maintains and develops a coordinated strategic spectrum of nuclear and conventional capabilities, including missile defence.

NATO defence planning is dominated by efforts to strengthen its capabilities for deterrence, collective defence and reassurance, as well as by the provision of crisis management capabilities, which is no less important. This requires the systematic adaptation of NATO’s defence forces and those of its members. Fully aware of its responsibility and ability, Germany will continue to make extensive contributions in these areas. As long as nuclear weapons can be employed in military conflicts, there will always be a need for nuclear deterrence. The strategic nuclear capabilities of NATO, and in particular those of the United States, are the ultimate guarantee of the security of its members. NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Through nuclear sharing, Germany continues to be an integral part of NATO’s nuclear policy and planning. At the same time, Germany is committed to the goal of laying the foundations for a world without nuclear weapons. NATO adopted this goal as part of its 2010 Strategic Concept.

A significant task of the Alliance, and one that is important for the collective security of our country, is establishing a missile defence system to protect the populations of its European member states. The reason for this is the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, particularly on the southern periphery of Allied territory.

The Alliance is also preparing for asymmetric and hybrid threats, including cyber attacks. The distinguishing feature of hybrid warfare, namely a blurring of the lines between war and peace, presents particular challenges when it comes to invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

International Crisis Management
Maintaining Allied capabilities to avert and tackle any challenges that may threaten the security of the Alliance and its members remains of great importance to Germany. This also ensures that NATO can be employed to lead operations on behalf of the international community. NATO’s crisis management operations are part of its active approach to ensuring security, which encompasses the prevention, containment and stabilisation of violent crises and conflicts as well as post-crisis and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO thus fulfils its responsibilities as a Euro-Atlantic security organisation with a global horizon.

NATO’s stabilisation operations, for instance in Afghanistan and in the Balkans, show that containing and managing conflicts in a complex security environment requires long-term and reliable commitment in order to maintain and consolidate progress.

NATO’s approach to effective crisis management involves empowering regional actors – individual nations and regional organisations – to assume responsibility for security and stabilisation. Initiated by Germany and anchored at national level, the Enhance and Enable Initiative has now entered NATO through the Defence Capacity Building Initiative.

In view of the importance of functioning and secure maritime transportation and supply routes, the subject of maritime security is also becoming increasingly important for NATO.

Cooperative Security
With its partnership policy, NATO supports the transfer of stability to the Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood. It also promotes cooperation and burden sharing with partners who share NATO’s goals with regard to security and crisis management. Germany is firmly committed to further strengthening this partnership policy. This will expand and enhance opportunities for targeted and also military cooperation and interoperability with partners outside the Alliance.

NATO – an indispensable guarantor of German, European and transatlantic security.
Individual partnership programmes have been designed to support states in re-establishing and reforming their security sector. This involves helping participating partners to meet NATO standards in the areas of democratic control and the rule of law. A partnership with the Alliance has helped many states to prepare for NATO membership. NATO and Germany remain committed to the principle of the freedom to form alliances and therefore to the open door policy based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to Article 10, any European state that furthers the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contributes to the security of the Alliance may be invited to join NATO.

Cooperative security is particularly important with regard to those states that traditionally have had a complex relationship with NATO. For a long time, Germany has been working towards establishing particularly cooperative relations with the Russian Federation and played a key role in the adoption of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. Germany continues to support the long-term goal of a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. For the time being, the Russian Federation’s current policies, which are reflected in the annexation of Crimea and the present doctrine declaring NATO a threat, necessitate a dual approach: credible deterrence and defence capability as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue.

A further important element of cooperative security is NATO’s active contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Strengthening NATO’s European Pillar
NATO’s European pillar is growing in significance. The European member states are called upon to assume greater responsibility, also in terms of a more balanced form of burden sharing. Germany in particular has taken on a special responsibility in this regard.

The Allies have agreed to move towards the long-term goal of spending a minimum of two per cent of their gross domestic product on defence. Germany remains committed to achieving this goal within the framework of its financial potential and resources. The crucial factor is still, however, the concrete result of this expenditure. Greater attention needs to be paid to how nationally invested funds contribute to strengthening NATO capabilities. This relationship between input and output is the guiding principle governing Germany’s actions.

Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept into NATO. This concept requires European NATO members to pool their capabilities to form multinational capability clusters in a structured and binding approach, and also to arrange themselves into larger units. The German Government is committed to increasing the relevance and visibility of European capabilities within NATO.
Germany’s willingness to assume leadership responsibility as a framework nation is an expression of our commitment and our aspirations. This is a role Germany already plays in multinational operations. There, Germany aims to enable other nations to contribute their capabilities for the benefit of all participants.

In addition, Germany expanded the principle of the framework nation to include capability development, thus allowing multinational capability development to be coordinated with our Allies. Deeper cooperation on a voluntary basis between European states will further enhance NATO’s ability to act. The overall goal of the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) is to improve the European capability landscape and to further strengthen the European pillar of the transatlantic partnership.

The Framework Nations Concept is an instrument that gives structure and a binding character to targeted multinational capability development. It allows participating states to harmonise their national capabilities. This initiative has met with a positive response in NATO. Germany’s willingness to assume leadership in this area is in line with our Allies’ expectations. Germany, with the support of the participating states, is therefore developing the requisite overarching control elements for the implementation of the FNC. The majority of European NATO members are now actively participating in the implementation and further development of the Framework Nations Concept.

Cooperation is organised according to a number of different fields (capability clusters). In each field, possibilities are analysed for building up multinational capabilities through cooperation between different partners. This includes establishing joint logistic support units during operations, providing multinational medical treatment facilities, and establishing joint training and exercise centres.

The focus of the Framework Nations Concept has since been expanded by examining the contributions it could make to the Readiness Action Plan. This includes plans to establish mission-ready multinational units of brigade size or larger over the long term.

On the whole, the medium- to long-term goal of the Framework Nations Concept is to create

- more efficient force structures,
- stable cooperation between the Allies and
- appropriate multinational capability development.

By developing the Framework Nations Concept, Germany has made a significant contribution to building European capabilities and will remain actively committed to ensuring that NATO and the EU are able to meet the challenges of the future.

NATO and the European Union

Given that NATO has primary responsibility for ensuring security in Europe, and since the majority of its members are also members of the European Union, NATO’s relationship with the EU is of particular importance. Complex security challenges such as in particular transnational terrorism, cyber security, and hybrid threats can only be countered through a comprehensive approach. With its unique but primarily military instruments, NATO is particularly dependent in this respect on cooperation with the EU and on its full range of not only foreign and security policy but also economic, trade, energy and development policy instruments.

Given the limited margin for necessary increases in defence budgets, it is important to share burdens, specialise and interlink armed forces, increase standardisation in the defence industry, harmonise procurement cycles, ensure joint certifications of military equipment, and develop and procure common capabilities so that we can achieve more synergies and greater effectiveness through complementary approaches and thus seek ways to ensure pan-European capability planning that is coordinated at transatlantic level.

The German Government will and is determined to

- aim to spend two per cent of its gross domestic product on defence and invest twenty per cent of this amount in major equipment over the long term and subject to available resources in order to meet the target set by NATO;
- work towards shifting the focus in NATO more towards the relationship between expenditure and performance in the areas of personnel, equipment and capability development;
- continue to make substantial contributions to strengthening NATO in the field of deterrence and collective defence. This includes assuming responsibility on a rotational basis as the lead nation for mobile and rapidly deployable forces (for example within the context of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force), commitment as part of reassurance measures as well as enhanced forward presence, the German contribution to NATO missile defence, nuclear sharing, and sustainable contributions in accordance with NATO planning goals. Of equal importance, we will maintain the flexibility of national forces in order to provide the capabilities needed to perform crisis management tasks;
- promote in NATO a dual approach to Russia consisting of credible deterrence and defence capability as well as a willingness to engage in dialogue and attempts at cooperative security;
- increase European capability development and the interlinking of European armed forces by means of the Framework Nations Concept in order to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. In this context, Germany is prepared to pave the way and assume a wide range of responsibilities as the framework nation. At the same time, Germany will provide its partners with key capabilities in a sustainable manner;
- develop proposals to support our Eastern partners in building capabilities and increasing interoperability by refining the originally German-American Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET);
generate synergies with NATO through the harmonisation of force planning processes and intensified joint exercise activities, and intensify cooperation particularly in countering cyber and hybrid threats and in the area of strategic communication and

support NATO’s partnership initiatives and instruments, including in its southern neighbourhood, in particular in order to strengthen interoperability and to use NATO’s expertise in establishing security structures.

Germany in the European Union
The European Union (EU) is an integral part of our country’s political identity. It stands for political stability, security, freedom and prosperity in Germany and in its member states as a whole. It is in our national interest to deepen European integration.

In times of internal crises and increasing centrifugal forces, a united Europe is particularly dependent on the efforts of its member states to promote integration. Furthermore, the support of its citizens is crucial. In the struggle for unity, Germany will continually seek a balance and work together with European institutions in order to bring these centrifugal forces under control, mediate between conflicting positions, and thus facilitate joint action. Once consensus is reached, European policy enjoys a high level of legitimacy and approval.

The prospect of one day being able to join the EU has had a stabilising effect over many decades. It is in Germany’s fundamental interest to strengthen this enhanced security and to maintain the momentum of EU enlargement. This will depend not least on whether the European Union can remain attractive. This requires not only strengthening the EU’s internal cohesion but also strict adherence to the accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria). The appeal and drawing power of the European peace project is the key to global influence and respect.

An Area of Common Security
The European Union’s new global foreign and security policy strategy will make a significant contribution to strengthening the EU’s capacity to act in the domain of foreign and security policy. From the very beginning, Germany has played an active role in supporting the development of this new strategy.

The EU is enhancing its profile in the field of international security policy. In doing so, it is pursuing a closely coordinated and interconnected approach with partners and other international and regional actors. The European Neighbourhood Policy with its partnership, association, free trade and visa facilitation agreements is a vital instrument for dealing with instability and crises in the neighbourhood of the EU. It must be continuously enhanced.

This also requires strengthening national and regional capacities so that our partners can take responsibility for ensuring their own security. Common action by the EU is the key to enabling our partners to live up to this challenge. The EU must provide the necessary means for training and equipment.

The asylum, refugee and migration policy and practice of the EU are relevant to, and have an effect on, security policy. The effective protection of Europe’s external borders is of central importance. With regard to refugee and migration policy, it is important to ensure equitable burden-sharing at European level and at the same time to develop viable solutions through dialogue with the countries of origin, the initial host countries, and the transit countries.
On the whole, the special strength of the EU is its ability to analyse and act in a comprehensive manner across many policy areas. The broad range of civilian and military capabilities of the EU in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is unique and can produce a special effect through the careful orchestration and implementation of diplomatic, economic, financial, energy and development policy measures, as well as instruments from the areas of domestic policy, justice, research and digitalisation.

This array of possibilities should be further harmonised, more strongly focused, and available and ready with the necessary speed. The nature of present and foreseeable crises necessitates faster, more flexible and more comprehensive responses. There is still much work to be done in this regard.

From the Common Security and Defence Policy to a European Security and Defence Union

The European Union has proved its operational capability in the field of CSDP in more than 30 missions on three continents. The member states of the EU have also agreed on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the Union.

Germany has continually taken initiatives, particularly in the Weimar Triangle consultation forum established together with France and Poland, to further develop and intensify CSDP. But it must be possible to use CSDP in a better and more effective way in future.

With its 500 million citizens, the European Union must act coherently and effectively in a highly volatile security environment. In view of the wide range of challenges and limited national options, we must strengthen European attempts to make the necessary structures more efficient and to eliminate existing capability deficits.

One way to make progress towards more reliable cooperation among those who see the need for it is permanent structured cooperation in the defence sector, which is provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU). This objective does not conflict with NATO – on the contrary, it strengthens NATO’s European pillar and reaffirms Europe’s willingness to permanently and reliably assume its share of responsibility.

CSDP includes the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This is intended to lead to a common defence. This means that, in accordance with the mutual defence clause in the Treaty of Lisbon, EU member states have an obligation towards one another to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. Article 42(7) TEU was invoked by France for the first time in the history of the EU following the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris.

In view of geopolitical shifts and global demographic developments, the only way we can assert the security interests of the EU over the long term, and thus maintain the political weight of the countries of Europe, is by seeking a greater degree of commonality.

Germany is striving to achieve the long-term goal of a common European Security and Defence Union. To achieve this goal we will focus

- firstly on the consistent implementation of the tasks assigned by the 2013 and 2015 European Councils for the gradual and concrete refinement of CSDP;
- secondly on the use of all options created by the Treaty of Lisbon, such as permanent structured cooperation;
- thirdly on the close and intricate network of bilateral and multilateral relations in the fields of defence and military policy which exists between EU member states and
- fourthly on initiatives to expand European capabilities in NATO (NATO’s European pillar).

To establish a European Security and Defence Union, it will be necessary to develop three areas of CSDP particularly in terms of actual usability, added value, and effect namely

- the enhancement of its structures;
- the integration of civilian and military capabilities and
- the strengthening of the European defence industry.

Based on NATO and EU requirements, the EU member states must aim for greater harmonisation of their capability development with the goal of achieving an interoperable, coherent and comprehensive set of European capabilities. Europe must use its limited resources in a more targeted and efficient manner.

We are therefore striving to gain partners for the common build-up and expansion of capabilities in Europe, and we will continue to close capability gaps by means of multinational solutions and European Defence Agency projects.
Our initial priorities will be UAVs, air-to-air refuelling, satellite communication, cyber protection, and cyber defence. Germany remains willing to act as both a framework nation and partner for multilateral projects and is prepared to consistently pursue this approach.

To strengthen the EU’s responsiveness and readiness in the civilian and military sectors, we are aiming to establish a permanent civil-military operational headquarters in the medium term. This will be a civil-military planning and command and control capability that is not yet available in this form in the EU member states.

Strengthening the European Defence Industry

Europe needs a strong and competitive defence industry of its own if it is to assume joint responsibility for security. The European defence industry, however, remains highly fragmented along national lines. Traditionally limited defence budgets and increased international competition present Europe’s defence industry as a whole with major challenges.

This has consequences both for the defence sector and European countries: disadvantages with regard to international competition, an unsatisfactory cost structure in the programmes and, as a result, a greater burden on national defence budgets.

A further restructuring and consolidation of Europe’s defence industries is therefore necessary. This is primarily the responsibility of the defence industry. The German Government will do what it can to support the necessary processes. In this context, Germany is placing a greater focus on European cooperation as well as on the transnational cooperation of companies which takes into account the national interests of each country. Together with the European Commission, the European Defence Agency, and key partners, we aim to intensify the Europeanisation of the defence industries. One goal of this process must be the harmonisation of arms exports guidelines within the EU. European harmonisation must be implemented in such a way that it does not fall short of the minimum requirements set out in the EU’s Common Position of 2008.

Within the context of the advancing Europeanisation of the defence industry, the German Government is committed to maintaining national key technologies. We must take the requisite technological and economic steps to ensure the necessary military capabilities and security of supply of the Bundeswehr as well as Germany’s role as a reliable partner and ally in particular in increasingly globalised supply chains.

With this aim in mind, the German Government has identified national key technologies, the availability of which must be ensured for reasons of national security and, if necessary, through coordination and cooperation with our European partners. These key technologies are based on the military requirements of the Bundeswehr, on foreign, security and European policy interests, on Alliance commitments, and on Germany’s responsibility. They are subject to regular review.

To maintain and promote key technologies, the German Government has at its disposal, among other things, the following instruments:

- interministerial coordination and prioritisation of research and technology measures;
- a targeted industrial policy;
- export promotion and
- the awarding of contracts by the Federal Ministry of Defence.

Particularly with regard to EU and NATO member states and countries with a NATO-equivalent status, the German Government will support export activities with foreign-trade and other instruments on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its restrictive guidelines on arms exports from the year 2000. It will also give special consideration to key defence technologies. This support can also be extended to third states if, in the case of war weapons, special foreign or security policy interests call for such measures in individual cases or if, in the case of other military equipment, a threat is not posed to the peaceful coexistence of nations or the foreign relations of Germany, both of which are protected under foreign trade legislation. Following a case-by-case review and if necessary, the German Government will reach bilateral ministerial and governmental agreements with partner states with respect to export promotion if this corresponds with its foreign and security policy interests and if this helps to improve the prospects of German companies with regard to major foreign procurement projects.

Since the European defence industry is being progressively consolidated, we should consider expanding the set of instruments of the German Government for maintaining key technologies in order to facilitate the strategic control and professional safeguarding of the interests of the German Government in sensitive areas (for instance through representation at executive and partner levels in companies).

The German Government will and is determined to

- make CSDP more visible to the general public, less technical and bureaucratic for its participants and partners, and more binding for EU member states;
- complement the new global strategy on foreign and security policy with a follow-on document for CSDP;
- emphasise the increased significance of CSDP through regular and ordinary as well as special meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council in the defence ministers’ format;
- enhance and enable third states and regional organisations and provide EU funds for this purpose;
- promote the joint build-up of capabilities through the bilateral and multilateral interconnection of armed forces, a rigorous lead nation approach, as well as the pooling and sharing of capabilities;
- increase the involvement of the European Defence Agency in planning new capabilities;
- strengthen the EU’s comprehensive approach;
- strengthen the EU’s responsiveness by means of a permanent civil-military planning and command and control capability;
- generate synergies with NATO through the harmonisation of force planning processes and intensified joint exercise activities, and intensify cooperation particularly in countering cyber and hybrid threats and in the area of strategic communication;
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest regional security organisation and a cornerstone of European security. With its broad understanding of security, its inclusive group of participants, its independent institutions, as well as its many and effective field operations, it forms a key element of the European security architecture. As a unique forum in which European, North American and Central Asian states can consult, cooperate and negotiate on security issues, its contribution to tackling complex challenges will remain indispensable for our future security.

The OSCE's principles must be strengthened, its commitments must be consistently upheld, and its capacity to act must be further enhanced. To this end, Germany has taken on a wide range of responsibilities and supports the OSCE politically, financially and also by providing personnel.

Germany in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

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The OSCE stands for dialogue, confidence building and conflict prevention in Europe, particularly in times of growing tension. For this reason, the OSCE is a key player in the search for a political solution to one of the most severe crises of European security since the end of the Cold War, namely the Ukraine conflict. In addition, the OSCE will continue to prove its worth as a forum for dialogue and cooperation which tackles common challenges such as transnational terrorism, organised crime, risks in the cyber and information domain, human trafficking, and migration. The OSCE’s geographical area of activity and established cooperation with partner states in the Mediterranean region and in Asia can provide new impetus for mastering common transnational challenges. This must be actively encouraged in future.

Germany supports close cooperation in the OSCE area and therefore aims to promote, renew and deepen pan-European security.

The following primary objectives must be met in order to achieve this:

- reaffirm that a comprehensive understanding of security, comprising not only political and military but also human, economic and environmental dimensions, is the key to resolving the European security crisis;
- increase efforts to provide long-term solutions to conflicts across the entire OSCE region;
- modernise the instruments of military confidence building and conventional arms control;
- strengthen OSCE capabilities and instruments throughout the entire crisis cycle (early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict assistance);
- increase the transparency of participating states’ cyber security policy, work together to avoid escalation due to incidents in cyber space, and agree on clear and effective rules of conduct on the basis of the sets of confidence-building measures adopted and their further development;
- improve the financial foundations for effective crisis management within the limits of available resources;
- strengthen the institutional basis of the OSCE by creating an international legal entity and
- strengthen cooperation with other security organisations and regional and international actors.
Dialogue and discourse – only together can we tackle the challenges facing us.

Bilateral and Multilateral Partnerships and Ad Hoc Cooperation

Close, reliable and long-term cooperation with allies and partners as well as with regional organisations forms the core of our security policy. Partnership and cooperation play a vital role in successfully tackling challenges to the international order and to peace and security.

By establishing and consolidating bilateral and multilateral relations, Germany promotes

- confidence building and common understanding between Germany and its partners and allies;
- the enhancement of existing alliances and unions;
- our country’s capacity to act, and that of our partners and allies, as well as
- the strengthening and formation of regional security cooperation.

Enduring features of our bilateral and multilateral relations are

- our partnership of values and security with the United States;
- the German-French partnership as the driving force for deepening European integration and ensuring peace, freedom and security;
- the security partnership with the United Kingdom, which has a long tradition and which we aim to further expand in all areas of common interest;
- our security cooperation and interaction with the Netherlands and Poland, as well as close cooperation with our other immediate neighbours;
- our close relations with Israel, and support for its right to exist, which is an unalterable element of German policy; and
- the fostering and further establishment of strategic partnerships with partners who share our values and with major regional powers.

In addition, we are building on close cooperation with states and groups of states that are able to contribute to tackling global and regional challenges. Common goals and interests form the basis for countering risks and threats jointly and responsibly.

In the past, Germany has repeatedly taken initiatives in new formats to develop solutions to emerging issues of security relevance. This does not affect the importance of established organisations. The UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE will continue to provide the primary framework for our actions.

Close, reliable and long-term cooperation with allies and partners as well as with regional organisations forms the core of our security policy.

New formats may include long-term cooperation with a broad and relevant agenda, such as the Weimar Triangle with France and Poland, or the Group of Seven (G7) or Group of Twenty (G20) major advanced economies.

But they may also include ad hoc cooperation and groups that play a role in developing and implementing constructive and transparent solutions for current and specific crises and challenges. Such groups include the E3+3 format (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China and Russia) for negotiations on the nuclear conflict with Iran, the Normandy format (Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia) established to resolve the Ukraine crisis, actions coordinated by a broad group of states for the purpose of countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, as well as our engagement in the international alliance to defeat ISIL.

Ad hoc cooperation will continue to gain significance as an instrument of international crisis and conflict management. Germany will take account of this development and, in cases where it can protect its interests in this way, will participate in ad hoc cooperation and initiate it with its partners.
Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Military build-ups in many states and regions, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the development of new weapon technologies present growing risks for the stability of the rules-based international order and the security of Germany and its allies. For this reason, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament are increasingly important instruments of crisis management.

At regional and global levels, Germany will give even stronger support to reaching comprehensive agreements on military confidence building, to limiting destabilising developments of armed forces, and to consistently preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we will take a multilateral and cooperative approach.

The adaptation of the instruments of arms control and confidence building to the new security and technology landscapes includes traditional and modern dimensions of security such as cyber, information and space, as well as the implications of new types of weapon systems. Germany strongly supports the further development and creation of arms control instruments as part of a modern and forward-looking security policy.

In the areas of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, Germany will pursue the following goals:

- take a new approach to conventional arms control in Europe which is based on verifiable transparency and focuses on modern military capabilities;
- substantially modernise the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe and further develop the Open Skies Treaty;
- strengthen and work towards the worldwide application of binding regimes such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
- combat the proliferation of small arms at global level by enabling our partners and regional organisations to improve the security of weapons and weapon storage sites, disrupt illegal arms flows, and destroy stockpiles of illegal weapons;
- reach a common understanding on the application of international law to the cyber and information domain as well as establish confidence-building measures and transparency on the cyber security policy of participating states of the OSCE, agree on joint action to avoid incidents in cyber space, and develop guidelines for the stabilising conduct of the participating states in cyber space;
- create transparency on the use of space and develop confidence-building measures for this purpose and
- continue our commitment to preventing in particular terrorists and non-state actors from gaining access to nuclear material worldwide in line with the resolutions of the Nuclear Security Summits.
THE FUTURE OF THE BUNDESWEHR
5 THE BUNDESWEHR OF THE FUTURE – MISSION AND TASKS IN A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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5.1 Demands on the Bundeswehr as an Instrument of German Security Policy

The Bundeswehr must be in a position to help achieve the strategic priorities of German security policy. The evolving security environment, our aspiration to play both a substantial and leading role, as well as our involvement in NATO and the EU make it necessary to continually update and adapt the task spectrum of the Bundeswehr. Multinationality and the whole-of-government approach remain guiding principles.

The demands made on the Bundeswehr will continue to increase. The growing international responsibility of our country is accompanied by military commitments as well as the increased expectations of our allies and partners.

The increased emphasis on national and collective defence including deterrence – especially on the periphery of the Alliance – means that the Bundeswehr must expand its mission orientation to include this challenging task and the necessary preparation. The resulting obligations and measures have taken on a new dimension with the most recent changes in the security environment. They will foreseeably make increased demands on the capabilities of the Bundeswehr across the entire spectrum.

The character of conventional national and collective defence has changed in comparison to the Cold War era. Armed forces of today must often face a spatially focused threat posed by military forces below or above the threshold of open warfare at short notice. This is increasingly part of a hybrid strategy that is characterised by the orchestrated use of military and non-military means across the full range of the threat spectrum.

At the same time, the dynamic nature of our security environment has led to an increase in the number of Bundeswehr operations around the world. It is not only the number of operations but also the demands made on the Bundeswehr that have changed fundamentally.

It is not only the number of operations but also the demands made on the Bundeswehr that have changed fundamentally.

Operations are no longer necessarily conducted in large contingents. The mission of soldiers on deployment will remain multifaceted in the foreseeable future. It ranges from training and humanitarian aid for people in need to the use of military force. In addition, it may also be necessary to employ the Bundeswehr more than before in a whole-of-government approach to security, in homeland security, and in interministerial assistance.

As a result, we must enable the Bundeswehr to deliver effects across the entire operational spectrum and ensure that it is ready and capable.
5.2 Mission of the Bundeswehr

The Bundeswehr is an important instrument of our security and defence policy. Its mission is based on constitutional guidelines as well as Germany’s values, interests and strategic priorities.

The mission of the Bundeswehr, as part of the whole-of-government approach, is to:

- defend Germany’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to protect its citizens;
- contribute to the resilience of state and society against external threats;
- support and ensure the ability of Germany to take action in matters of foreign and security policy;
- contribute together with partners and allies to countering security threats to our open society and to our free and safe world trade and supply routes;
- contribute to the defence of our allies and to the protection of their citizens;
- promote security and stability in an international framework and
- strengthen European integration, the transatlantic partnership, and multinational cooperation.

5.3 Tasks of the Bundeswehr

On account of our identity, the role we see for ourselves, and the international role of Germany in a challenging security environment, our strategic priorities must be pursued simultaneously. The following tasks of the Bundeswehr are thus of equal importance. The execution of these tasks may vary, however, in terms of character and intensity.

Based on its mission, the Bundeswehr performs the following tasks in a whole-of-government approach:

- National and collective defence in the framework of NATO and the EU, including:
  - conducting defence tasks on German territory as well as deterrence measures in all domains;
  - defending against attacks on the territory of Allies;
  - defeating terrorism and defending against hybrid threats;
  - consolidating the transatlantic and European defence capability and
  - conducting measures to reassure and support Allies as part of Alliance solidarity in order to protect Germany, its citizens and partners and to deter potential adversaries.

- International crisis management, including active military and civil-military contributions to:
  - national early warning processes;
  - conflict prevention, crisis management, post-crisis assistance, and stabilisation in international organisations, alliances and partnerships;
UN peace missions;
- the fight against transnational terrorism, against threats from the cyber and information domain, and against new hybrid dangers;
- the protection of sea lines of communication and
- the enforcement of embargos and sanctions
in order to stabilise our international environment across the entire threat and crisis spectrum and to defeat threats to our country and our allies.

Homeland security, crisis management for German nationals abroad, and subsidiary support in Germany, including
- performing national territorial tasks;
- monitoring and securing German airspace and territorial waters;
- monitoring critical space infrastructure;
- permanently performing subsidiary tasks as part of interministerial agreements;
- providing assistance in the event of natural disasters, serious accidents, states of emergency, and interministerial assistance;
- contributing to counterterrorism operations in the framework of the constitution;
- rescuing and evacuating persons isolated abroad;
- contributing to evacuations from critical situations and
- contributing to hostage rescue missions abroad
in order to contribute to national security and the resilience of state and society.

Partnerships and cooperation above and beyond the EU and NATO, including
- enhancing and enabling the security structures of partners and regional organisations;
- establishing and cultivating bilateral security and military ties and
- conducting arms-control and confidence- and security-building measures
in order to contribute to modern defence diplomacy, capacity building, and interoperability through multinational integration and international security cooperation.

Whole-of-government effort – the Bundeswehr is part of the comprehensive approach.

Prepared and enhanced: the Bundeswehr for the cyber and information domain

As a high-value target for state and non-state actors and as an instrument of effective cyber defence, the Bundeswehr must be prepared to face complex attacks. Defence against such attacks necessitates high-value defensive and offensive capabilities that must be continually exercised and further developed. On account of the speed of innovation and the global nature of cyber threats, we must take a comprehensive approach. Only with international partnerships and cooperation with industry and research institutions will the Bundeswehr remain agile and capable.

In order for the Bundeswehr to perform its tasks in the cyber and information domain, we must above all
- develop national capabilities, in other words promote a whole-of-government approach and cooperate with research institutions, industry and partners;
- develop Bundeswehr cyber capabilities, in doing so consolidate the security architecture of its IT system and make it more resilient;
- make weapon systems, command posts, and armaments supply chains more robust by using, among other things, key national technologies;
- recruit the very best personnel by creating attractive career paths in cyber, designing innovative personnel recruitment strategies, and establishing new partnerships and cooperation programmes and
- bring together the various responsibilities and structures for a robust build-up of capabilities, pool IT capabilities for digitalising the armed forces, and create central points of contact for other ministries and multinational partners.
6 GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE BUNDESWEHR OF THE FUTURE

6.1 Multinationality and Integration
   NATO Capability Development
   Leadership and Responsibility as a Framework Nation

6.2 Flexibility and Agility with a Single Set of Forces

6.3 The Comprehensive Approach in a National and International Framework
The dynamic nature, diversity and development of crises will have an enormous and prolonged effect on the further development of our armed forces. The long-term approach to ensuring the security of our country must account for and assess the variables of such developments in the context of our membership in NATO and the EU as well as our national whole-of-government approach. These are the foundations of the guiding principles for the Bundeswehr of the future.

6.1 Multinationality and Integration

Multinationality and integration are and will remain key elements of the Bundeswehr. In order to shape defence and military policy, we must ensure that the Bundeswehr has a comprehensive set of bilateral and multilateral instruments that are consistently used and continually updated. Multinationality and integration are realised in particular in structures, operations, long-term joint multinational capability development programmes, and other forms of cooperation as well as in armaments policy.

NATO Capability Development

NATO’s Strategic Concept provides the basis for a complementary set of capabilities of all member states which is orchestrated through the allocation of national planning goals. These are supplemented by planning requirements of the EU in the framework of CSDP.

They determine the orientation of the capabilities of the Bundeswehr towards national and collective defence, international crisis management, and the development of partnerships. As a result of this coordinated and burden-sharing approach, the effectiveness of German defence efforts as well as the capability of NATO and the EU will be increased.

The resulting capabilities are supplemented by precautionary measures and arrangements for a national whole-of-government approach to security.

The developments in NATO which began with the 2014 Wales Summit call for increased efforts in national and collective defence to improve readiness and response.

This goes hand in hand with the objective of strengthening the capabilities of the Europeans as well as the European pillar of the Alliance.

The Framework Nations Concept initiated by Germany meets these requirements.
Leadership and Responsibility as a Framework Nation

Germany is willing to assume responsibility and leadership as a framework nation in alliances and partnerships.

This necessitates not only the national or joint provision of critical capabilities, which often first make possible the operations of our allies and partners, but also a willingness to develop such capabilities together with other nations.

In order to make a tangible and valuable contribution, the Bundeswehr must above all ensure the availability of these capabilities and encourage sufficient interoperability and industrial standardisation.

6.2 Flexibility and Agility with a Single Set of Forces

The single set of forces must cover the entire spectrum of Bundeswehr tasks in all their complexity, in various combinations, and for different lengths of time.

The necessary flexibility and agility can only be delivered by a multifunctional and adaptable Bundeswehr. This applies in equal measure to personnel, material and training. The resources of the Bundeswehr must be suitable for carrying out different tasks in different theatres (multitrole capability).

This will only be possible with structures that are resilient to known challenges and adaptable to unforeseeable developments. This structural resilience and personnel and material adaptability must above all meet the requirements of new areas of operation.

We therefore need

- a “breathing” body of personnel that is adapted to the tasks at hand;
- a comprehensive set of capabilities;
- modern, appropriate equipment to improve readiness and responsiveness;
- supplementary mission equipment packages, in order to fulfil tasks across the entire operational spectrum;
- broadly based training, in order to prepare personnel for all conceivable scenarios and future technologies.

6.3 The Comprehensive Approach in a National and International Framework

Security and stability can only be ensured by a coordinated comprehensive approach involving all actors – nationally and internationally. This guiding principle is making an ever deeper imprint on the entire spectrum of Bundeswehr operations and is integrating the Bundeswehr into a coordinated joint crisis management process. The Bundeswehr acts in accordance with this principle in all phases of crises and conflicts. This can take different forms such as contributing to a common operational picture, enhancing and enabling security forces in a conflict-affected region, conducting stabilisation operations, and providing post-crisis assistance.

The comprehensive approach must thus be further enhanced and developed in the Bundeswehr. Cooperation between the Bundeswehr and state and non-state actors must be further intensified by

- contributing to the establishment and expansion of whole-of-government structures and offering to establish a network with non-state actors;
- developing common infrastructure for communication and for exchanging data and information;
- strengthening the exchange of personnel between ministries;
- developing common training courses, exercises and seminars with state and non-state actors;
- contributing to the establishment of common planning, assessment and analysis skills and providing experts and expertise for international organisations.

Cooperation between state and non-state actors – vital for successful mission accomplishment of the Bundeswehr.
7 GUIDELINES FOR THE CAPABILITIES OF THE BUNDESWEHR

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As we are willing to assume responsibility and leadership, the changing nature and quantity of Bundeswehr tasks must be reflected in capability development.

The Bundeswehr requires a broad spectrum of capabilities in order to accomplish its mission.

The ability of the Bundeswehr as a whole to deliver effects in all domains – land, air, sea, cyber and information, and space – is the overall objective. Especially in the land, air and maritime domains, the ability to fight remains essential. It makes the highest demands on personnel and equipment.

Survivability and the protection of our personnel and our capabilities – even against attacks from the cyber and information domain – are essential for the accomplishment of tasks. At the same time they are an expression of responsibility for the people entrusted to the Bundeswehr.

The ability of the Bundeswehr to accomplish its tasks depends above all on

- the adaptability of its personnel, equipment and structures;
- high-quality, modern and high-tech capabilities including the availability of critical capabilities (such as the medical evacuation chain and medical support on operations, communication and information systems, and strategic air transport) in order to assume responsibility as a framework nation as well as to carry out national tasks independently and
- rapid availability, high levels of readiness and appropriate sustainability, and strategic deployability.

To this end, the Bundeswehr structures its capabilities according to the areas of command and control, reconnaissance, effects and support. These areas are equal and mutually dependent and must therefore be interlinked. An agile, resilient and robust Bundeswehr must be ensured in this engagement network.

### 7.1 Command and Control

Command and control must be geared towards employing forces and assets in accordance with the mission and requirements so that the desired effect can be achieved. A prerequisite of effective command and control is near-real-time, seamless information collection, processing and distribution across all levels of command. Information superiority must be possible, and the flow of information must reflect the “need to share” ethos. This requires a clear, task-oriented command and control organisation, clear and standardised command and control procedures, powerful and resilient command, control and information systems, and modern information and knowledge management. All elements require the presence of a powerful command support system. The ability to lead as a framework nation is of paramount importance. Joint interoperability is required for the effective performance of tasks in a nationally and multinationally interlinked approach and for the integration of partners. For this reason, the foundations must be laid for the horizontal and vertical integration of partners.

### 7.2 Reconnaissance

Globally oriented and multinationally compatible reconnaissance is essential for effective intelligence collection and thus for the ability to analyse, assess and lead at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The German Government thus requires continual contributions to maintain situational awareness at the interministerial level and to develop its options. Reconnaissance must encompass the entire spectrum of national and international crisis prevention and of crisis management. The early recognition of crises plays an important role in this context. The build-up of regional expertise must therefore be encouraged and sustained.
7.3 Effects

Effects are decisive for the accomplishment of tasks. As a result of the changed and complex task spectrum of the Bundeswehr, we must redefine the full range of effects and these effects must be reflected in a more differentiated set of capabilities. We must cover the range of direct and indirect, physical and psychological effects at the same time: from humanitarian aid and enabling and enhancing partners by providing advice, training and equipment to the use of military force. We must be able to achieve effects superiority at all levels of intensity.

Particularly in the case of military force, precision and scalability are important prerequisites for delivering intended effects and avoiding collateral damage. Standoff capability increases the likelihood of success and improves the survivability and sustainability of our forces.

7.4 Support

Support is an elementary prerequisite for command and control, reconnaissance and effects. It must – including with recourse to contributions from industry – enable all military and civilian organisational elements to accomplish their tasks. Logistics, healthcare, and routine duties at home are necessary prerequisites for accomplishing our mission. In the changed task spectrum of the Bundeswehr, we must in particular lay the foundations for ensuring our ability to project force, to deploy, and to act alongside partners. We must further develop support at the national level and coordinate it with other nations, with an eye towards Germany’s role as a framework, lead and host nation.
8 MAKING THE BUNDESWEHR FIT FOR THE FUTURE

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Our identity, our international role, our commitments, and the complex security challenges have changed in terms of their nature and scope and have direct consequences for the Bundeswehr. An effective contribution by the Bundeswehr to German responsibility and leadership thus calls for a balance between its task spectrum and resources. The following areas of engagement constitute the framework and fields in which the Bundeswehr needs to undergo continuous modernisation so that it can remain a viable instrument of German security policy.

8.1 Legal Framework

In the course of its more than sixty-year history, the Bundeswehr has demonstrated that it lives up to its constitutional mission. The ability of defence to function properly is a constitutional requirement. Defence is a state responsibility, which the armed forces have the duty to fulfil. All actions of Germany’s armed forces are subject to the primacy of politics. International law and the German constitution are the foundations of all actions taken by the Bundeswehr.

Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

Bundeswehr missions abroad over the past twenty years have been conducted in compliance with international and constitutional law and in and according to the rules of mutual collective security systems.

In recent times the number of deployments and missions necessitating immediate and resolute action has grown. A rapid response is frequently called for when it comes to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, tackling human and drug trafficking on the high seas, and supporting partners at short notice in stabilisation operations. This increasingly leads to ad hoc cooperation between states.

Particularly in cases where the prerequisites under international law for military action are already met (for instance, in the form of a request for support by a host government) and thus a further mandate under international law is not required, it is increasingly difficult to take action in a system of mutual collective security.

In view of Germany’s increased responsibility for security, we must be in a position to meet these challenges, if necessary by deploying armed German forces.

The rules-based international order with its systems of collective security will continue to be the primary framework for our engagement. In view of the changed security and defence policy requirements, however, the German Government supports the recommendation of the Commission on the Review and Safeguarding of Parliamentary Rights regarding Mandates for Bundeswehr Missions Abroad, namely that the German Bundestag “consider in a suitable procedure a possible reform of the constitutional framework for Bundeswehr missions abroad”.

Parliament and Bundeswehr Missions Abroad

For the German Government to send the Bundeswehr on an armed mission abroad, the consent of the German Bundestag is required by the constitution. This practice of parliamentary consent has stood the test of time. The fact that decisions on Bundeswehr missions abroad are made by the German Government in concert with the German Bundestag helps servicemen and women see themselves as a parliamentary army on operations with broad support and approval.

For Germany as a NATO member as well as for any further integration in the EU, we must be able to act and to play a substantial role in a reliable manner in these institutions.

Immediate and resolute – operations abroad contribute directly to our security.

The Government in concert with parliament – our servicemen and women on deployment can rely on a broad base of consent.
Deployment and Role of the Bundeswehr in Germany

In accordance with Article 35(1) of the German constitution, the armed forces may render administrative assistance at home. Such measures are limited to technical and logistic support. They are below the threshold of operations. Refugee aid and relief is a current example of such assistance. The Bundeswehr cannot exercise enforcement measures and sovereign powers on this basis.

In Article 35(2), second sentence, and (3), the German constitution expressly allows the deployment of the armed forces at home at the request of a federal state or at the instruction of the German Government in the event of natural disasters and serious accidents (emergency situations). Large-scale terrorist attacks can be considered to be such an emergency situation. The German Constitutional Court has confirmed that, in order to assist the police in effectively managing emergency situations, the armed forces may, in certain conditions, perform sovereign tasks and exercise powers of intervention and enforcement.

In the context of present-day threat situations, the deployment of the armed forces in effective disaster response plays an important role within the narrow limits of unusual emergency situations and in accordance with current constitutional law. It is important to foster good cooperation between the federal and state authorities that work together in the event of a disaster and to conduct exercises for them. We must be able to rely on them as part of a common and responsible approach to ensuring security in our country.

Irrespective of this, the German Government can, in a state of defence or tension, employ the armed forces for facility protection and traffic control responsibilities pursuant to Article 87a(3) of the German constitution. According to Article 87a(4) of the constitution, the armed forces can also be deployed in the event of an internal emergency if the conditions referred to in Article 91(2) are fulfilled, in other words if there is an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of Germany or of a federal state. The strict conditions to which the use of the armed forces in internal emergencies is tied precludes any recourse to Article 35(2) or (3) of the constitution.

8.2 Strengthening the Bundeswehr’s Place in Society

A quarter of a million people serve and work in the Bundeswehr. Thousands of men and women join every year. At the same time, thousands of servicemen and women leave the Bundeswehr every year and take up civilian professions. Added to this there are the reservists, who feel committed to the Bundeswehr and voluntarily support the armed forces after finishing their active service. This constant and lively interaction ensures that, even after the suspension of compulsory military service, the Bundeswehr reflects all socially relevant groups. Active as well as former servicemen and women play a key role in increasing public awareness about the Bundeswehr.

The people in this country recognise the importance of our citizens in uniform. They rely on them, they are grateful, and they feel connected to them. Their interest in them is sincere. This is expressed in a multitude of respectful gestures and words. Surveys have shown that a growing majority of Germans highly regard and trust the Bundeswehr. Not least of all the positive response at public events such as the Bundeswehr Day has shown that the Bundeswehr is firmly embedded in society.

With this broad foundation, the Bundeswehr today has every reason to feel confident. It looks upon the acceptance it enjoys in society with understandable pride. It is important to cultivate and encourage the further growth of this relationship. This is why the Bundeswehr endeavours to be authentic and approachable to the general public – through the personal conduct of its members, through openness, and through a willingness to engage in discussion.

This relationship helps servicemen and women in particular to perform their mission. They feel supported by the people whose rights and freedom they have sworn to bravely protect and, in extreme circumstances, even lay down their lives for. In this spirit, the Bundeswehr promotes discourse on security policy in our country, for example through its youth officers. A constant exchange about the Bundeswehr and its tasks is needed and should be as extensive and serious as possible and as controversial as necessary.

A reliable partner – not only abroad but also at home.

Controversy is colourful – the Bundeswehr is ready and willing to debate.
The Bundeswehr will thus present itself as an armed force in a democracy and for democracy.

- It cultivates close personal interaction, for example through exhibitions, information activities, the Bundeswehr Day, internships and reserve service in units. This underpins its aspiration to provide first-hand information and expertise.

- It helps shape the discussion of security policy in society. It does this by intensifying exchanges with important actors and developing its concept of civic education.

- It is expanding reserve service and keeping it attractive. Reservists are an important part of national security and support the Bundeswehr through their abilities and skills in routine duties and on operations. At the same time they provide an essential link between the Bundeswehr and society. The Bundeswehr will continue to enhance the reserves. This will include identifying opportunities for cooperating with industry, which plays a central role in supporting the reserves.

- It takes care of its former servicemen and women.

- It has a special responsibility toward active and former members of the Bundeswehr who suffer from the consequences of military operations.

- It honours the memory of fallen servicemen and women and all military and civilian personnel who have died in the service of our country.

8.3 Innere Führung: A Core Element of the Bundeswehr’s Identity

The Bundeswehr will continue to be open, modern and widely interconnected in future owing to the strong cohesion and confidence of the people serving in it. The basis for this is Innere Führung, or leadership development and civic education. It is and will remain an indispensable foundation for individual and collective action in the armed forces, as it recognises the conscience of each and every individual as a moral authority. A conflict will remain between personal democratic liberties, on the one hand, and the soldierly principles of duty and obedience, on the other. Innere Führung enables servicemen and women to act with confidence, conviction and skill and make sound judgements. It gives them the courage and assurance to arrive at responsible and ethically informed decisions. This philosophy serves as a guiding principle for human interaction, one that superiors must practice on a daily basis.

Experiencing and interacting – Bundeswehr Day.

Innere Führung – reaching decisions through dialogue.
Innere Führung ensures that the training of military personnel is not confined to manual skills alone but, in fact, strengthens ties to the values of our democratic society. Only in this way is it possible for people with different origins, backgrounds or motivation to act as a collective at decisive moments, without being compelled to give up their personality.

Innere Führung is central to the identity of our armed forces and is something for which the Bundeswehr is often envied. It must prove its relevance time and again, however. Not only experiences such as death and injury and deployments in foreign cultures can have a long-term effect. Social developments are also automatically reflected in the Bundeswehr and alter its inner fabric. Innere Führung ensures that, even when confronted with change, military personnel retain their shared fundamental values, follow their country’s democratic principles, develop and, if need be, debate new ideas – with freedom of interpretation, yet adhering to established principles.

All members of the Bundeswehr, whether in uniform or civilian clothes, form a single entity, today more than ever before. The Bundeswehr needs people with a strong conscience, character, and sense of responsibility. It does not judge by appearance, but by what is on the inside. It unites men and women who reflect the cultural, religious, biographic and social diversity of our country. Collectively, all members of the Bundeswehr fulfil their responsibilities in the spirit of Innere Führung when, out of conviction, they champion freedom, peace, human dignity and democracy.

Over the past decades, Innere Führung has shown itself to be a sound and dynamic foundation. In order to develop it further, we must

1. take into account the changing character of ongoing and future missions and also consider the ethical challenges that arise through new forms of conflict;
2. use it as a basis for strengthening multinational and bilateral cooperation and for gradually establishing a European command and control philosophy and
3. ensure in future that it offers all members of the Bundeswehr a meaningful framework – as a uniform corporate culture that harmonises identity, command and control philosophy, and leadership.

8.4 New Approaches to Tradition

Value-based traditions and their cultivation are important elements of the Bundeswehr’s leadership philosophy. Our servicemen and women need not only a rational but also an emotional foundation for their demanding mission. Special importance will always be accorded to the Prussian reforms and the resistance against the National Socialist regime. They serve as important role models and as a source of moral strength. Traditions, though, have to be practiced.

Every generation must perceive the present-day relevance of traditions. For this reason, the Bundeswehr must

1. review its traditions on a regular basis,
2. develop them further when necessary and
3. embrace new traditions as a learning organism.

For this purpose, the Bundeswehr will be placing increased emphasis on its own successful, over sixty-year history as a tradition to be cultivated. It is a history of armed forces in a strong democracy which proved themselves not only in the Cold War but also after 1990, when they embodied the reunification of our country from the first day onward. It is also the history of a force on operations. Servicemen and women have shown what they can do in combat and have proven their readiness and skills. The Bundeswehr has had to learn to deal with death and combat injuries. This has prompted the creation of places of remembrance such as the Bundeswehr Memorial in Berlin and the Forest of Remembrance in Potsdam.

More than 60 years of history – a strong anchor for tradition in the Bundeswehr.
The Bundeswehr has been shaped by service in foreign countries and foreign cultures, by routine multinational cooperation, and by diversity within its own ranks. Its inner strength, beliefs and values have withstood all changes and outside influences. In the armed forces, the system of duty and obedience functions across all hierarchies on the basis of democratic principles and the rule of law. This is a key accomplishment and should be included among the traditions of the Bundeswehr.

Traditions are cultivated in the Bundeswehr by passing values, symbols and guiding examples down to the next generation, especially in our more recent history. This is based on a culture of open dialogue and personal commitment.

8.5 Sustainable Financial Parameters

In order for Germany to continue to play an active and substantial role in security and defence policy, the ministries entrusted with foreign, security, development and defence tasks need adequate financial resources in the context of broader budgetary developments. Structures, equipment and personnel are generated based on tasks and requirements and must be funded in a sustainable manner.

For this reason, mission-ready armed forces capable of meeting alliance commitments must be available. These forces must reflect our identity, our ambition, and our role as well as the expectations of our international partners and must be able to make an effective contribution as an instrument of a sustainable and comprehensive security and defence policy. The financial framework must enable the Bundeswehr to fulfil its spectrum of tasks, which have changed in character and increased in scope, and to meet alliance requirements. The financial resources for these goals are provided in accordance with the budgetary decisions of the German Government.

An effective contribution by the Bundeswehr to German responsibility and leadership calls for a balance between its task spectrum and resources.

At present, the Bundeswehr does not yet have sufficient structures and resources to attain these goals. With an appropriate defence budget, it will be possible to harmonise tasks, structures, personnel and equipment so that future requirements and challenges can receive the necessary consideration.

A starting point regarding the development of defence spending according to NATO criteria is the decision taken at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 whereby Allies should aim to move toward spending approximately two per cent of their gross domestic product on defence. Overall, apart from giving adequate consideration to the running of the Bundeswehr, we must in particular increase investments in armaments and equipment so that over the medium term we meet the twenty per cent mark set by NATO. Only in this way can running costs and investments be harmonised with tasks.

The 2016 defence budget and the 49th Federal Financial Plan (until 2019) mark a turnaround in the financing of the Bundeswehr. Following the benchmark decision taken by the German cabinet, this positive trend is set to continue in the 2017 budget. A reliable continuation of this direction in funding will be required in the years ahead in order to take into account capability maintenance, increases in equipment in line with tasks and structures, and the necessity of establishing new capabilities, while ensuring the staffing and running of the Bundeswehr.

Such funding will allow the Bundeswehr to provide the necessary and requested capabilities fully and at the proper time and also to ensure the ability of future generations to take action. It will also allow Germany, as a driving force in Europe, to promote the goal of joint capability development and to fulfil its role as a framework nation.
8.6 Modern, Sustainable and Demographically Sound Personnel Policy

The people serving in the Bundeswehr are the most important factor for the operational readiness and responsiveness of Germany’s armed forces. A major organisation such as the Bundeswehr requires a modern, sustainable and demographically sound personnel policy that will consistently and actively meet future demands. Demographic changes in Germany and the growing shortage of skilled workers will have a marked impact on social and economic developments over the coming decades. The Bundeswehr is affected by associated phenomena such as population aging and the thinning-out of rural infrastructure as well as by increasing globalisation, digitalisation and individualisation. Changes in life goals and realities necessitate a better work-life balance. As an employer, the Bundeswehr must respond flexibly and proactively to all these challenges. The Bundeswehr can ensure mission accomplishment and operational readiness only if it has a body of personnel that is tailored to actual requirements. It must position itself constantly as a competitive, flexible and modern employer. Since the end of the Cold War, personnel numbers in the Bundeswehr have undergone continual and significant reductions. Most recently, the reorientation of the Bundeswehr in 2010/2011 set the personnel ceiling at its lowest level ever.

Reversal in Personnel Trends

The current and expected security situation necessitates an adjustment in the staffing levels of military and civilian personnel. It has become evident that the Bundeswehr can no longer meet requirements with a rigid personnel ceiling. If operational readiness and responsibility are to be taken seriously, the Bundeswehr must have the personnel it needs to perform national and collective defence as well as international crisis management missions in an agile, robust and sustainable manner.

The Bundeswehr requires a modern, sustainable and demographically sound personnel policy.

In future, the Bundeswehr will rely even more on multi-talented, specialised and highly qualified personnel. In the long term, we must tap additional potential because technological progress and digitalisation will require expertise that the Bundeswehr does not have, at least to the necessary extent. Extensive autonomy will no longer be the guiding principle in personnel policy. Instead, permeability between the Bundeswehr and industry will have to be increased. Exchange schemes between industry and the Bundeswehr which facilitate cooperation with external personnel for a specific period of time are one way of meeting this challenge.
A reversal in personnel trends is needed in order to establish, expand and further develop required capabilities across the full spectrum of defence activities. As a first step, there will be no further reduction in the number of military posts. In addition, personnel levels in future will be based on security requirements. The aim of necessary additional personnel – both military and civilian – is to strengthen the Bundeswehr and maintain its ability to respond. This will involve

- a high degree of flexibility, as well as regular reviews of planned and actual staffing levels which take into account changes in tasks and

- the principle of a “breathing” body of personnel without fixed upper limits, in accordance with current constitutional and budgetary law.

This new approach will make it possible to adjust personnel strength as needs dictate whenever the security situation and thus the demands facing the Bundeswehr change.

**Personnel Strategy**

To respond to changing circumstances at an early stage, the Bundeswehr requires a comprehensive and forward-looking personnel strategy that identifies future shortages in good time and systematically recruits and develops the personnel needed for the tasks ahead. It should anticipate the key areas where personnel must be developed today in order to avert problems with quantity and quality in the future. To achieve this, the personnel strategy will be geared towards the following:

- timely and flexible personnel recruitment;

- improved career conditions for specialists;

- promotion schemes based on performance and equal opportunities;

- individual consideration of life phases, preservation of experience and knowledge, skills orientation, as well as specialisation and qualification under attractive conditions;

- innovative career models that enable even the best-qualified members of the Bundeswehr to balance family and career without disruptions.

The new personnel strategy will not only analyse future needs. It will also focus personnel recruitment on new and suitable target groups at an early stage. In addition, the personnel strategy will provide new impetus. Under it, opportunities for education, training and qualification will be adapted, and changes in the working environment will be introduced with a view to optimally preparing men and women in the Bundeswehr for future challenges. This will also include support for personnel leaving the Bundeswehr and making the transition to the private sector. The success of former members is an important calling card for junior personnel of tomorrow. The new personnel strategy will also strengthen the transfer of expertise and skills to and from the private sector and in this way address new target groups. Last but not least, opening up the Bundeswehr to citizens of the EU would not only offer potential for wide-ranging integration and regeneration and thus strengthen the personnel base of the Bundeswehr, it would also send out a strong signal for a European approach.

Education and qualifications – the best preparation for the challenges of today and tomorrow.
Attractiveness Agenda

Competing for the smartest and most talented people is an important issue for the Bundeswehr. It, too, is vying for a good position in the increasingly competitive market for skilled and qualified personnel. The Bundeswehr is looking to become one of the most attractive employers in Germany. This is why it has launched its agenda “The Bundeswehr Leads the Way – An Active, Attractive Alternative”. The German Government has modified the legal framework in many areas in order to improve and modernise working conditions for military and civilian personnel of the Bundeswehr. The Federal Ministry of Defence has initiated a number of additional incentives. These include:

- modern accommodation;
- flexible working conditions;
- childcare arrangements;
- state-of-the-art IT equipment and
- improved pay and social security for many servicemen and women.

To take better account of the needs of individual personnel, the Bundeswehr is also modernising many of the instruments used in personnel management. The work-life balance plays a central role. Our goal is to ensure that men and women serving in the Bundeswehr will be able to develop their abilities and talents to the fullest in all life phases. All of the steps we have taken and will take in the future are intended to foster an integrated body of military and civilian personnel and a Bundeswehr-wide identity. Further efforts to boost the attractiveness of serving in the Bundeswehr will be required. Improving the attractiveness and sustaining the competitiveness of the Bundeswehr as an employer remain an ongoing strategic task. The attractiveness of the Bundeswehr will always be influenced by the attitude and satisfaction of its personnel.

Equal Opportunities, Diversity, Inclusion

German society is becoming more colourful and diverse. The Bundeswehr sees this diversity as an opportunity. Like other armed forces, the Bundeswehr benefits from a greater variety of experience and qualifications. Intercultural skills and multilingualism help to accomplish missions. Teams with different experiences and backgrounds are more successful than homogeneous groups. At the same time, deliberate engagement with diversity strengthens the role of the Bundeswehr in society. All these aspects will help the Bundeswehr to achieve a stronger personnel base and to be more successful. Encouraging diversity and equal opportunities, for example with respect to ethnicity, sexual orientation, and gender identity, is a top priority at all command levels. As one of the nation’s largest and most diverse employers, the Bundeswehr seeks to appeal to all sectors of society. The Bundeswehr also learns from:

- modern and successful diversity management systems of allied armed forces;
- other public bodies as well as institutions in the private sector;
- academic research and
- social dialogue, as well as national and international exchanges on this subject.

The aim is to establish a modern diversity management approach in the Bundeswehr which makes better use of available potential and strategically develops future potential. This will focus on areas such as age, inclusion, ethnic or cultural origin, gender, religion, and sexual orientation. Diversity management is a top priority at all command levels. This underscores the comprehensive and strategic character of this task for the Bundeswehr as a whole.
Recruitment
People who are flexible and well qualified have good prospects in today’s labour market. Employers need good arguments in their favour to recruit the best young talent. The Bundeswehr can build on a strong brand and on the widespread trust it enjoys in Germany. Opinion polls show that the Bundeswehr is recognised as a dependable employer that guarantees quality training and education. In its recruitment activities, the Bundeswehr
- emphasises qualifications and relevance, which large sections of the population identify with a career in the Bundeswehr;
- appeals to target groups and directly addresses potential applicants for understaffed occupations in the Bundeswehr and
- underlines what only it can offer, namely operations and missions, a duty of care to its people, comradeship, and a special bond of loyalty and trust.

Today’s Bundeswehr offers a broad range of career opportunities. Although it can still recruit sufficient personnel five years after the suspension of compulsory military service, the Bundeswehr must tap further potential in the labour market. Similar to industry, the Bundeswehr lacks specialists such as IT experts, engineers and medical personnel. Such people must be directly addressed. We must also increase the percentage of female personnel and personnel with a minority ethnic background. They play an important role in the image the Bundeswehr conveys.

Reserves
The Bundeswehr and industry can benefit from one another to an even greater extent. The lively exchange facilitated by reservists is special in this regard. The reserves will have an important role in developing and delivering capabilities required in the future. Bundeswehr reserve forces will remain indispensable for national and collective defence, homeland security, and international crisis management operations. Reservists not only make a valuable contribution across the mission spectrum of the Bundeswehr in Germany and abroad. Their ongoing commitment is also a symbol of the strong link between the armed forces and society.

To meet needs and also build resilience in society, we must encourage permeability between the Bundeswehr, society and industry. In particular, this will involve
- making reserve service as a whole more attractive;
- enhancing it so that reservists and external personnel can deliver reliable long-term support, especially in the cyber domain (cyber reserve) and
- creating reserve exchange arrangements between industry and the Bundeswehr which improve cooperation with external personnel.

Strong arguments as an employer – early opportunities for a wide range of careers.

Mutually benefiting from an exchange of knowledge and experience – the role of reservists is changing.
8.7 Best Possible Equipment and Armaments for Accomplishing Our Mission

With the many challenges it faces, the Bundeswehr needs the best possible equipment in order to fulfil its mission successfully and protect the lives of its servicemen and women. This can only be achieved by transparent, effective, flexible and modern armaments procurement.

In 2014, an extensive external report on selected armaments projects revealed deficits in armaments management and also recommended ways to improve the situation. Based on this report and on internal analyses and assessments, an overarching approach to modernising armaments procurement was developed. Known as the Armaments Agenda, this approach defines a way forward in order to set a strategic course for armaments procurement (the orientation of procurement); lays down general operational objectives in order to modernise armaments procurement (the goals of procurement) and establishes and optimises sound foundations in order to ensure the control and strategic management of armaments procurement (the means of procurement).

Numerous changes have already been initiated on the basis of the Armaments Agenda. For example, we have: high-quality, effective, flexible and modern armaments procurement;
defined a new, uniform approach to risk management;
improved reporting to the German Bundestag and made it more pro-active;
strengthened contract management and increased the quality and quantity of personnel employed in armaments procurement.

These initial results show that transparent, effective, flexible and modern armaments procurement is possible. Implementing associated changes internally and externally and thus assuring the sustainability of our approach will remain the greatest challenge.

The reorientation of armaments procurement is based on the following premises:
- The Bundeswehr procures according to its requirements and in this way takes a modern approach to armaments management.
- An independent, strong and competitive defence industry in Europe, including the national availability of key technologies, is essential.
- Multinational cooperation is strengthened by the lead nation approach.
- Innovation is the key to the future.
- Internal and external transparency is a strategic principle.

Modern Procurement – “For the Bundeswehr”

The expanded task spectrum of the Bundeswehr is a determining factor for modern armaments management. This strict approach is never an end in itself but always for the Bundeswehr and thus always in accordance with its requirements.

These requirements are diverse and dynamic and have to be planned, prioritised and met in different ways. For instance, it is necessary to differentiate between off-the-shelf purchases and in-house developments. IT with its typically short innovation cycles must be procured much quicker than other equipment. Urgent operational requirements must be handled much more pragmatically than the long-term planning of major weapons systems.
Modern armaments management sees itself as a service provider. This includes the transformation of the “one-size-fits-all” approach to planning and procurement into a differentiated approach that is more closely attuned to the purpose and object of procurement. A close-knit planning and procurement approach is the basis of these processes.

The modernisation of armaments management is a medium- to long-term project that will require a significant cultural change. What is necessary, therefore, is political support and top-down control of this process by the Executive Group of the Federal Ministry of Defence with the participation of the relevant specialist levels. To ensure the success of this cultural change we must

- implement a value-based leadership culture;
- practice a culture of trust, responsibility and error management as well as
- train and educate command and executive personnel for such a culture.

In addition to equipment, the Bundeswehr will in future be even more reliant on versatile and highly qualified (and thus specialised) personnel. The Attractiveness Agenda has laid important foundations for this purpose. Over the long term it will be necessary to tap additional potential, since technological progress and increasing digitalisation will require expertise that the Bundeswehr itself does not have. Extensive autonomy will no longer be the guiding principle in personnel policy. We must therefore increase permeability between the Bundeswehr and industry and also explore new avenues of cooperation. Transparency and compliance will be guiding principles.

The Europeanisation of Defence and the Retention of Key National Technologies

The defence industry in the EU remains highly fragmented along national lines. This results in unsatisfactory cost structures, disadvantages in international competition, and potentially higher burdens for our defence budget. The national focus can also lead to a lack of interoperability between European armed forces when on operations together.

For this reason we must plan, develop, procure and deliver military capabilities together and increase the interoperability of armed forces in Europe so that we can enhance Europe's capacity to take action. The Bundeswehr will do everything it can to support the efforts of the German Government in this respect.

At the same time we must protect our own technological sovereignty by maintaining key national technologies in order to ensure military capabilities and the security of supply chains. To this end, the Federal Ministry of Defence will make available its special expertise in development, procurement, training and in-service support. To maintain and foster this expertise, the German Government has the following instruments at its disposal: interministerial coordination and prioritisation of research and technology measures; a targeted industrial policy; the awarding of contracts by the Federal Ministry of Defence; and export promotion (performed on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the German Government’s restrictive guidelines on arms exports from the year 2000). Export promotion is particularly for EU and NATO countries and for countries with a NATO-equivalent status. This support can also be extended to third states if, in the case of war weapons, special foreign or security policy interests call for such measures in individual cases or if, in the case of other military equipment, a threat is not posed to the peaceful coexistence of nations or the foreign relations of Germany, both of which are protected under foreign trade legislation.
New Approach to Multinational Armaments Cooperation
Multinational cooperation in armaments procurement is becoming increasingly important. High development costs and low national procurement volumes are the driving force behind this development. In many cases, only with joint procurements can we meet national capability requirements at the desired technological level. At the same time, multinational cooperation is a political instrument for building confidence between nations and for strengthening and deepening bilateral and multilateral relations and also helps to improve interoperability, which is absolutely necessary in the Alliance.

In the past, multinational cooperation projects have frequently been plagued by a variety of problems that have led to cost increases and delays. The A400M, Eurofighter and NH90 projects in particular have shown how insistence on national capability requirements can defeat the desired advantages of working together. The numerous lessons learned over the past decades must be taken into account in future cooperation. These include, in particular:

• In multinational programmes, contracting authorities must strive for the most standardised design possible on the basis of uniform capability requirements in order to effectively reduce development, procurement and maintenance costs.

• One nation (if possible on the side of the contractor and the contracting authority) should assume responsibility for the development and realisation of a project in a lead nation approach. Germany must support the lead nation function of other nations just as it must assume responsibility in selected lead nation projects.

• Production should not automatically be carried out in the lead nation but wherever there is the best industrial and technological expertise.

• A collective approach should be taken not only to development and procurement but also to maintenance, repair and operational support.

This new approach will boost European and transatlantic interoperability through standardisation and also facilitate multinational military operations. The goal must be for European nations to take the next step toward a truly integrated industrial structure in Europe. Multilateral cooperation is a promising way of achieving benefits through industrial consolidation. This is seen in development and procurement programmes that have been organised according to the lead nation approach, for example in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (MALE UAV) and possible cooperation on submarines.

Essentially this means relinquishing individual sovereignty for the greater sovereignty of all. At the same time, we must protect our own technological sovereignty by retaining key national technologies.

Innovation: A Key to the Future
Constant innovation is needed in order to deliver effective protection and ensure the superiority of armed forces. We need high-technology armaments because

• protective technology significantly improved in the 20th century;

• effects-based systems have also become more accurate, thereby reducing the potential for collateral damage, and

• operations nowadays are highly networked – through satellite connections and encrypted communication.

Armaments-related R&T activities are thus a central driver of innovation in the armed forces and the defense industry. Spillover effects into civilian industry (dual-use applications) continue to be a desirable secondary effect and goal of military R&T. The current challenges surrounding the cyber and information domain, digitalisation, autonomous systems, and hybrid tactics however call for the further development and expansion of the traditional R&T approach with own resources:

• Many sources of forward-looking technological innovation exist outside the defence sector. Their numbers are increasing.

• Innovation is becoming less linear and instead more and more disruptive and exponential. Technologies such as artificial intelligence have many applications that require not only planning but also explorative development.

Superiority through innovation – the ambition of our R&T activities.
The Bundeswehr needs to be receptive to this new notion of innovation in armaments. To do this, the Bundeswehr must, in the long term,

- play a greater part in innovation outside its own R&T;
- approach new drivers of innovation, such as startups and the digital economy as a whole;
- develop a strategic management and target system for the R&T and innovation portfolio;
- make available resources for explorative, disruptive research that is not based on specific individual developments;
- engage in a debate, together with parliament, about a new risk management culture that is appropriate to more complex developments;
- consider the development of an agency or enterprise that functions as an interface to innovative actors and, where necessary, also manages resources for investment in studies or startups in key technologies.

Transparency: A Strategic Principle

Transparency is a strategic principle that applies throughout the Armaments Agenda. Greater transparency for the general public and parliament forms the basis for lasting social and political acceptance of armaments procurement.

The central component of the transparency initiative in armaments procurement is the new system of standardised risk management and reporting for armaments projects. This system will identify risks and problems at an early stage and initiate suitable measures for avoiding disruptions. As a rule, the effects of this system will not be immediate, and it will not always be able to compensate for older problems – especially in projects that began several years ago.

Risks are inherent particularly in complex major projects. The goal must therefore be to identify and manage the risks. This requires a change in culture.

The system of standardised risk management and reporting has become an important management tool on all levels since its introduction. The lessons learned are continuously fed into the reporting and decision-making processes as well as into the half-yearly report of the Federal Ministry of Defence to the German Bundestag on armaments matters.

A new vision statement for armaments procurement has been drawn up in order to strengthen the culture of transparency. Further measures may include the introduction of a compliance management system and the adoption of a code of conduct for working with industry.

Structural Framework

To date, changes and improvements in armaments procurement have taken place within the existing structural framework. This imposes clear limits on the change process. This process will be supported by

- achieving a suitable degree of flexibility in public service and personnel law;
- achieving flexibility in the sustainable financing of major long-term projects and programmes and
- making appropriate structural changes in armaments procurement.

In the long term, we must therefore consider evaluating the structural framework and related conditions so that we can make significant and sustainable improvements and harness new potential.

8.8 An Agile and Adaptable Organisation

The mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr determine its organisation and structure. Its structure and processes must be based on the goal of timely and effective task accomplishment.

The organisation that was foreseen by the latest Bundeswehr reorientation will be largely in place by 2017. In the new structures and processes, all capabilities are to be joint and Bundeswehr-wide. These accomplishments will be ensured and further developed through continuous modernisation.

The type, scope and intensity of the tasks performed by the Bundeswehr have changed and will continue to change, however, due to the dynamic and complex security environment. For this reason, we must continually coordinate tasks, available personnel and material resources as well as structures.

Flexible and adaptable – demands made on our organisation, not just on operations.
Given the increasing requirements and in view of the size, diversity and complexity of the Bundeswehr as an organisation, we must

- enhance our strategic, management, and command and control capabilities;
- increase agility;
- extend digitalisation and networking and
- strengthen and develop a common organisational culture.

As a major organisation with complex objectives and functions, the Bundeswehr has strict requirements to meet with regard to its strategic, management, and command and control capabilities. These capabilities must be improved and focused in the framework of strategy development and process management. We must, for example, have clear operational guidelines (service-level agreements) for armaments and personnel processes so as to ensure measurability and consistent management. All relevant processes will thus be geared continuously to effective mission accomplishment. In addition, we must streamline our organisation rigorously, pool responsibilities, and ensure effective decision-making processes in administrations and headquarters with a view to strengthening our armed forces.

As an agile organisation, the Bundeswehr must be flexible and adaptable in its response to new and changed requirements.

As an agile organisation, the Bundeswehr must be flexible and adaptable in its response to new and changed requirements. Only in this way will it master the challenges of continuous modernisation and increase its resilience and robustness. Reduced duplication, clear interfaces, and focused, objective management in the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence will also be necessary in order to noticeably increase the efficiency of all processes. The changes we make must be sustainably fundable and demographically sound. Where new tasks make demands on the organisation which existing structures cannot fulfil, resources will be reallocated to make innovative approaches possible.

An agile Bundeswehr must have structures that are flexible enough to allow it to swiftly make necessary changes in personnel and equipment. It must reduce red tape and decentralize responsibility in accordance with the principle of mission command. In addition, changes in the areas of personnel and equipment call for Bundeswehr infrastructure that is appropriate for tasks and structures.

Closely linked to this is our increasingly computerised and networked society, which also has direct implications for the Bundeswehr as an organisation. Considerable changes are necessary – from personnel recruitment to organisational processes – if we are to tap this potential. Resistance must be overcome and acceptance encouraged.

The Digital Agenda of the German Government is also a high priority for the Bundeswehr as a whole. Close cooperation with the Federal Ministry of the Interior is necessary and planned.

Given the highly complex tasks of the Bundeswehr, we must strengthen and enhance the collective organisational culture of civilian and military personnel.

To do this, we will

- successively introduce a target-based system of strategic control;
- strengthen the role of the Steering Committee at the level of the Permanent State Secretaries and the Chief of Defence;
- expand the strategic capacity of the area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence by pooling analysis and advisory expertise and using it for strategic guidance in aspects of defence and military policy; in this way, the Federal Ministry of Defence will help foster the interministerial strategic capacity of the German Government;
- continue to review and optimise processes;
- increase the degree of digitalisation in the organisation and make even greater use of its benefits;
- continue to build a leadership culture that is based on common values and is binding for the entire area of responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Defence;
- continue to foster a culture of trust, responsibility and error management and
- plan the establishment of a compliance management system.

As an agile organisation, the Bundeswehr must be flexible and adaptable in its response to new and changed requirements.

The Bundeswehr – innovative approaches and processes of a learning system.
Germany is facing challenges that are unprecedented in their nature and scope. The same is true of the Bundeswehr, which must confront new challenges for which it is not yet adequately prepared.

There are historical and complex reasons for this which can be traced back to the end of the Cold War. A reunited Europe brought the hope of a peaceful future and a “peace dividend”. Germany was no longer a frontline state. The “Army of Unity” was downsized, its capabilities and equipment reduced. This eventually resulted in stagnating defence spending.

After 1990, defence spending as a percentage of Germany’s gross domestic product fell by more than half. The widespread feeling that threats to German security had diminished combined with economic challenges following German reunification meant that defence was no longer considered a top priority. The strength of the Bundeswehr was reduced by a number of reforms to today’s force levels and its capabilities were focused on likely operations in the context of global crisis management.

At the same time, however, Germany’s role in Europe and the world changed when Germany regained full national sovereignty. It became clear that Germany now had the same rights, obligations and responsibilities as every other state in the international arena. Operations, particularly in Afghanistan, became increasingly robust, and spending had to be prioritised to ensure that deployed forces had proper equipment. The Bundeswehr had become a “force on operations”.

As a result, national and collective defence became increasingly less important. Budgetary constraints forced the Bundeswehr to make painful compromises in many areas, particularly in routine duty and in national and collective defence, as the only way to meet the increased demands of operations.

Like other European allies, Germany suspended compulsory military service and restructured its armed forces accordingly. This led to upper limits on commonly used major weapons systems and on personnel, irrespective of the tasks for which they were required. There was no longer a balance between tasks, forces and assets.

Today, a reoriented and streamlined Bundeswehr finds itself confronted with crises and conflicts of unprecedented simultaneity and dimensions.
Our aspiration to play a substantial role, the many trouble spots in Europe’s neighbourhood and beyond, and increased expectations about the role Germany should play in foreign and security policy necessitate a change in order to restore a balance between the tasks the Bundeswehr performs.

The Bundeswehr must reorient itself towards its most comprehensive task, namely national and collective defence, and must also provide the forces and assets required for international crisis management and crisis management for German nationals abroad. At the same time, the number of theatres of operations around the world is continuously growing. As a consequence, the Bundeswehr faces a wide range of challenges seldom experienced on this scale. It must be able and prepared to perform tasks simultaneously.

The Bundeswehr is part of a growing network of instruments designed to guarantee our national security. To ensure the effectiveness of our future whole-of-government commitment to security, we must in particular

- increase our strategic capacity by, among other things, further strengthening the Federal Security Council as a provider of strategic stimulus and other appropriate interministerial bodies for prioritising the crisis response of the Federal Government;
- fund, develop and provide the resources for a full range of foreign, security and development policy instruments on a sustainable basis with available financial resources;
- coordinate more effectively and further develop our comprehensive approach;
- base our approach to ensuring national security on resilience and a whole-of-government effort within the given financial framework and
- assume responsibility for the stability and security of the international order by, among other things, consistently enhancing our preventive security policy, particularly in connection with the early recognition of crises and our enhance and enable approach.

As the main anchor of our security policy and no less important than international crisis management, effective collective defence is crucial to our very existence on account of the renaissance of traditional power politics and the instabilities on the periphery of NATO territory. Germany is therefore working towards strengthening NATO’s European pillar in order to increase the capacity for action of NATO and the EU. Germany will additionally seek to further consolidate its own multilateral orientation.

To achieve this, progress must be made in capability development and the integration of armed forces at European level. This must be accompanied by the gradual refinement of CSDP. The long-term goal of German security policy is to create a European Security and Defence Union.

The many diverse and parallel tasks of the Bundeswehr will have to be performed in future by a single set of forces and will require appropriate task-oriented mission equipment packages for the forces so that they can accomplish their mission. In this way, the Bundeswehr will make allowances for the new relevance of national and collective defence and at the same time will be multifunctional; equipment and personnel will have multi-role capabilities. This will create the flexibility and agility needed for the Bundeswehr to make contributions to key areas of engagement in line with its strategic priorities.

Multinationality and integration are and will remain the key factors shaping the Bundeswehr of the future. They are reflected in structures, operations, capability development and armaments policy, among other things. The expectations placed on Germany to assume responsibility, including as a framework nation, require it to provide or support critical capabilities that are needed for other nations to participate in operations.

This will make it possible to employ operationally ready and responsive armed forces in a flexible and adaptable manner as part of a comprehensive approach at national level as well as on a multinational basis so that we can respond rapidly to changes in our security environment.

Only with sufficient resources as well as personnel and equipment appropriate to its tasks and structures will the Bundeswehr be able to meet future challenges and play an appropriate role as part of a German security policy that reflects our understanding and acceptance of responsibility. Important prerequisites for this transformation are sustainable and, in particular, stable funding, as well as personnel and equipment levels that are based on the tasks and challenges facing the Bundeswehr.

This will enable the Bundeswehr, as an instrument of German security policy, to effectively perform its many new and multifaceted tasks.

Germany, along with the Bundeswehr, stands for loyalty to its allies and reliability both at home and abroad. Guided by its interests, it is prepared not only to assume responsibility in international security policy but also to play a substantial and leading role.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Alliance Ground Surveillance</td>
<td>Alliance Ground Surveillance (airborne ground reconnaissance and surveillance system)</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa</td>
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<td>CFE Treaty</td>
<td>Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>E3+3</td>
<td>Format comprising the states participating in negotiations on the nuclear conflict with Iran (Germany, France, United Kingdom, United States, China and Russia as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)</td>
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<td>EATC</td>
<td>European Air Transport Command</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FNC</td>
<td>Framework Nations Concept</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of seven leading industrial nations</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of twenty most important industrialised nations and emerging economies</td>
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<td>GGE</td>
<td>Groups of Governmental Experts</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Terrorist organisation calling itself Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
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<td>MALE</td>
<td>Medium-altitude long-endurance (unmanned aerial vehicle)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;T</td>
<td>Research and technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACET</td>
<td>Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union (the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>VJTF</td>
<td>Very High Readiness Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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