“We are learning more every day about who poses a threat to us and how”.

The tasks of the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command and the Bundeswehr Homeland Defence Command had to be transferred seamlessly to the new command after its establishment on 1 October 2024. Our efforts have succeeded. Each task area transferred or taken on was a milestone in itself. As of 1 April, we have taken full responsibility.

The NATO decision at the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025, following the acts of sabotage against critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, to initiate the Baltic Sentry mission as a reconnaissance and surveillance mission was particularly important for me. The Bundeswehr Joint Force Command made detailed plans for the German contribution – at very short notice and with a small number of personnel, while handling the transfer of tasks from the Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command and the Bundeswehr Homeland Defence Command.

We have shown that we can ensure consistent performance of our tasks while also being able to respond to changes in the situation at any time. We were also able to quickly prepare the operational picture.

An assessed operational picture is an essential basis for preparing strategic decisions. Reliable planning and valid forecasts can only be achieved with knowledge of all facts – from the available forces to the threat situation. In addition to the land, air, maritime, space, and cyber and information domains, our situation picture also includes the functional medical and logistics situation pictures.

We know which forces are committed and which are not, and what capabilities are available during what period of time. Apart from the military data and intelligence situation, information from civilian security agencies such as the Federal Police and Customs also contributes to our situation picture.

And the analysis is not only concerned with Germany, but covers the whole of Europe, the North Atlantic and the Middle East. This also includes looking at the crisis regions of the world. The objective is not to analyse the past, but, for example, to predict and prevent hybrid attacks before they become a reality.

Our added value is the holistic view. As the Commander of the Bundeswehr Joint Force Command, I am now able to align the forces and capabilities of the Bundeswehr with a goal, a military effect: This enables me to set operational priorities and address threats more rigorously and consistently.

We are learning more every day about who poses a threat to us and how, and can therefore respond to and deter threats more quickly as the situation calls for. In this way, we are making the force more powerful and contributing to Germany’s security and resilience.

Following the Army and the Navy, the Bundeswehr Joint Force Command is now taking on the role of exercise coordination command for Quadriga and will retain this responsibility. In the future, one of our priorities will be conducting exercises for operation plans and interaction of the command levels of the domain and capability coordination commands in order to even better align our command and control processes with the requirements of effective national and collective defence.

That means: If there is a threat to NATO’s external borders, NATO must be able to respond very fast by deploying its forces through Germany with only a few days’ notice. This scenario then expands very quickly such that, within 180 days, up to 800,000 troops from friendly nations move through Germany to their various employment areas as fast as possible with their weapons, vehicles and supplies. These troops need accommodations and supplies on their way through Germany. We will show that this works.

We need to pay special attention to Russian narratives taking hold in the information environment and their impact on the mood in our society. There are significant attempts to exert influence through cognitive warfare. Every technology – artificial intelligence, bots, disinformation – is used to influence public opinion.

AI image generators create supposed visual proof that is very difficult to recognise as fake news and can spread all over the world in seconds. As the potential for manipulation increases, the importance of verified data and information is also growing. In this regard, it is important to raise awareness in our society and make it more resilient. But this is a whole-of-society task and not a mission of the armed forces.

The analysis of third-party wars is part of the Bundeswehr’s operational evaluation. Operations and exercises are also observed and evaluated. The aim is to identify relevant changes in warfare and incorporate them into the armed forces’ capability development – but only those changes that are truly relevant.

There is a risk of backing the wrong horse, especially when it comes to technical developments. At the same time, we tend to limit research on technical innovations, rather than exploring potential developments and then deciding whether to make military use of them or refrain from using them, for example for humanitarian reasons.

This approach carries the risk of potential adversaries gaining an innovation lead that is difficult to catch up with. We need to know what the adversary is using in order to effectively engage it. We see this in artificial intelligence as well as use of drones.

Unmanned systems have become indispensable, whether as reconnaissance, command and control or weapon systems. They are changing warfare. In this respect, they are comparable to the tank. But military history also shows: Whenever a new weapon system is introduced and successfully employed, the development of countermeasures is also progressing. In Ukraine, we also see this interaction between new attack systems and defence measures to counter them – with very fast innovation cycles, ranging from weeks to just a few months.

But technology alone is not a game changer. It requires tactical integration into the planning and conduct of operations and operational procedures in order to be effective. To stay with the example of the tank: The success of the tank is not based on its armour and firepower, but on the combination of fire and movement with mission command and cooperation in an integrated system that only became possible through radio technology. This also applies to unmanned systems.

And while – as we can also see in Ukraine – drone swarms can freeze front lines and create a no man’s land not controlled by either side, it still takes armoured combat forces to develop mobility and striking power. At the end of the day, it takes having personnel on the ground to gain control over terrain.